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ARTICLES
PROCEDURAL LABYRINTHS AND THE INJUSTICE OF
DEATH: A CRITIQUE OF DEATH PENALTY HABEAS COR-
PUS (PART TWO)
Alan W. Clarke*
The following is part two of a two-part article that critiques
death penalty habeas corpus. Part one of this article includ-
ed discussions of the ineffective assistance of counsel and the
federal habeas corpus exhaustion requirement. 29 U. RICH.
L. REV. 1327 (1995). Part two of this article, which follows,
discusses issues related to retroactivity in habeas corpus
proceedings and procedural default.
IV. RETROACTMTY IN HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS: THE
RULE IN TEAGUE V. LANE
A. Introduction
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(Kingston, Ontario, Canada). This article is based upon the author's masters thesis
that was written at Queen's University in Ontario, Canada. The author wishes to
thank Richard Bonnie, Professor of Law, University of Virginia, and Phillip Goldman
and Allan Manson, Professors of Law, Queen's University, for their many helpful
comments and suggestions. I also thank them for their patience.
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1. The Rule of Nonretroactivity
One of the most restrictive new procedural devices judicially
legislated by the Rehnquist Court is the doctrine of
nonretroactivity. This doctrine is crucial to the interaction of
the federal habeas courts with the state courts. State-court
adherence to federal constitutional norms is, in part, a function
of the supervision that the federal habeas courts are able to
exert over the state criminal justice system. If the federal habe-
as courts can overrule cramped interpretations of constitutional
law by state courts, then state courts must apply the spirit of
the law or risk reversal. The lower the risk of reversal, the less
a court need concern itself with scrupulous adherence to prece-
dent. The Supreme Court's massive docket prevents it from
effectively policing the fifty state criminal justice systems. Thus,
the question of when a federal habeas court can apply a Su-
preme Court decision retroactively to a state criminal conviction
is inextricably bound up with the question of how faithful state
supreme courts must be toward Supreme Court precedent.
In 1989, the Supreme Court, in a clear break with prece-
dent,' decided, subject to two narrow exceptions, to prohibit
retroactive application of new constitutional rules in habeas
corpus proceedings.2 Teague v. Lane came unheralded: the issue
was not briefed by the parties to the controversy,3 and was
considered sua sponte.4
The Teague plurality decided that new constitutional rules
should not ordinarily be applied or announced retroactively in
cases on collateral review except that: (1) "a new rule should be
applied retroactively if it places 'certain kinds of primary, pri-
1. In Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), the Supreme Court established
a balancing test for determining when new rules of constitutional criminal law would
be retroactively applied. Id. at 628-629. The "Linkletter standard" balanced the pur-
pose served by the new rule, the extent of law enforcement's reliance on the old
standard, and the effect on the administration of justice. Id.
2. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
3. Id. at 330 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Astonishingly, the plurality adopts this
novel precondition to habeas review without benefit of oral argument on the question
and with no more guidance from the litigants than a three-page discussion in an
amicus brief.").
4. Id. at 299.
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vate individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-
making authority to proscribe"' and, (2) retroactive application
is permitted for "watershed rules of criminal procedure"6 that
are "central to an accurate determination of innocence or
guilt."' Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion purported to borrow
this formula from former Justice Harlan,' with one modifica-
tion that added the accuracy element to the second exception.
The rule, as formulated and subsequently applied, bears little
resemblance to the late Justice Harlan's conception of retro-
activity.9
5. Id. at 311 (citation omitted).
6. Id.
7. Id. at 313.
8. The plurality in Teague explained that Justice Harlan believed that new rules
of constitutional law should not ordinarily be applied retroactively by a federal habeas
court. Id. at 305. This, he thought, should be subject to two exceptions. Id. at 307.
The first exception, which Teague adopts, comes directly from Justice Harlan's opinion
in Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971) (involving "certain kinds of pri-
mary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making au-
thority to proscribe").
The second exception is an amalgamation of two of Justice Harlan's ideas. In
his dissent in Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969), Justice Harlan focused on
the accuracy-enhancing function of habeas corpus. Id. at 262 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
However, in Mackey he rejected this formulation and instead focused on whether a
particular new procedure "altered] our understanding of the bedrock procedural ele-
ments that must be found to vitiate the fairness of a particular conviction." 401 U.S.
at 693 (emphasis added). Thus, Justice Harlan rejected a focus on innocence and
instead focused on what might be called a fundamental fairness exception for the
retroactive application of new procedural rules. Justice Harlan viewed these two for-
mulations of the second exception as mutually exclusive. Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court in Teague joined these two separate strands into a single, much more restric-
tive test requiring that before a new procedural rule could qualify under this excep-
tion and be applied retroactively on habeas corpus, it must be both a watershed rule
of criminal procedure and designed to enhance the accuracy of the trial. Teague, 489
U.S. at 312.
9. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, Habeas and Hubris, 45 VAND. L. REv. 797, 811
(1992) ("[Tihe Teague decision resembles Justice Harlan's views much like a kidnap-
ping note pasted together from stray pieces of newsprint resembles the newspaper
from which it came."). Critics complain that by adding the innocence component to
the second exception, and by construing the ambit of a "new rule" far more broadly
than Justice Harlan, Teague operates to exclude issues from review far more broadly
than would have been the case under Justice Harlan's conceptions of nonretroactivity.
See Larry W. Yackle, The Habeas Hagioscope, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2331, 2385
(1993)("At the same time, however, this Court defines 'new rules' and the exceptional
circumstances in which they should be invoked quite differently from Harlan.").
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2. The Questions and Complexities Raised by Teague
Habeas corpus admits of few issues more complex or contro-
versial' ° than the nonretroactivity bar of Teague. Despite the
apparent simplicity of the rule-no new law on habe-
as--questions abound. The rule has been called a "jurispruden-
tial morass,"" and courts of appeal have found that "[tihe
lines are fuzzy."" Even Teague's author, Justice O'Connor, ad-
mits that "Itihis Court's retroactivity jurisprudence has become
somewhat chaotic in recent years."
3
The rule remains in flux. 4 From 1989 to February 1994 the
issue has played a major part in a large number of cases."
There is no indication that this trend is at an end. Capturing
the essence of a quickly changing concept is difficult. Nonethe-
less, it is important for habeas litigators, particularly where life
itself is at stake, to acquire a basic working knowledge of the
10. Most of the law review articles addressing Teague have been critical. See, e.g.,
Friedman, supra note 9; Steven M. Goldstein, Chipping Away At the Great Writ: Will
Death Sentenced Federal Habeas Corpus Petitioners Be Able to Seek and Utilize
Changes in the Law? 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 357 (1990-91); Eliot F.
Krieger, The Court Declines in Fairness-Teague v. Lane, 25 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
164 (1990); James S. Liebman, More Than "Slightly Retro:? The Rehnquist Court's
Rout of Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction in Teague v. Lane, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc.
CHANGE 537 (1990-91); Yackle, supra note 9. For a more positive view, see, Patrick
E. Higginbotham, Notes On Teague, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 2433 (1993).
11. Robert Weisberg, A Great Writ While It Lasted, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLO-
GY 9, 28 (1990). Weisberg also notes the incongruity of "the conceptually impossible
distinction between a ruling that follows ineluctably from precedent and one which
concededly expands precedent . . . in a judicial world where courts rarely acknowl-
edge that they do any more than draw ineluctable conclusions from precedent." Id. at
22-23.
12. Taylor v. Gilmore, 954 F.2d. 441, 445 (7th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2112
(1993).
13. Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 113 S. Ct. 2510, 2526 (1993) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting). Harper was a civil case in which the Court discussed the evolution of
retroactivity law in both civil and criminal contexts.
14. See 2 JAMEs S. LIEBMAN AND RANDY HERTZ, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRAC-
TICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 25.1 to .8 (2d ed. 1994).
15. See, e.g., Caspari v. Bohlen, 114 S. Ct. 948 (1994); Schiro v. Farley, 114 S.
Ct. 783 (1994); Godinez v. Moran, 113 S. Ct. 2680 (1993); Gilmore v. Taylor, 113 S.
Ct. 2112 (1993); Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892 (1993); Lockhart v. Fretwell, 113
S. Ct. 838 (1993); Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482 (1992); Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S.
222 (1992); Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990); Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37
(1990); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990);
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989); Zant v. Moore, 489 U.S. 836 (1989).
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nonretroactivity rule and its exceptions. This article sketches
out the essentials, but its brevity prevents consideration of the
many interesting historical and institutional issues generated
by the Teague rule.16 The major questions raised by Teague
and its progeny divide generally into three categories: (1) how
is a new rule defined? (2) to what and how does the rule apply?
and (3) how and when do the exceptions operate? Much is sub-
sumed within these imprecise lines of inquiry. Because the
"new rule" doctrine of Teague is complex and subtle, it will be
easier to consider the exceptions first and then exclude them
from the discussion. The narrowness of these exceptions will
make clear the importance of the "new rule" doctrine.
B. The Exceptions to Nonretroactivity
1. The First Teague Exception: The Constitutionality of
Criminal Conduct
The first Teague exception arises when the rule in question
holds that the accused's conduct was not criminal. It applies to
"an actor's primary conduct"'7 as addressed by the substantive
law. In Penry v. Lynaugh,5 the Court extended the exception
to the capital sentencing proceeding. The Court extended the
rule, that was arguably limited to situations where conduct
itself was decriminalized to the capital sentencing arena, where
the issue was not whether the conduct was proscribed, but
rather whether the conduct was such that the death penalty
could constitutionally be imposed. This enlargement of the ex-
ception followed obliquely from Coker v. Georgia, in which
the Court held that the death penalty for rape violated the
Eighth Amendment "cruel and unusual punishment" proscrip-
tion.20 Coker established that certain types of conduct were
placed beyond the reach of death penalty statutes by the
Eighth Amendment. Ford v. Wainwright, in which the Court
16. Three articles that raise the institutional and historical issues well are Fried-
man, supra note 9; Liebman, supra note 10; and Yackle, supra note 9.
17. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311.
18. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
19. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
20. Id at 592.
21. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
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prohibited the execution of prisoners who are insane at the
time of execution, also supplied an applicable analogy. Both
conduct and status could be placed beyond capital punishment's
reach. Applying this concept to the first Teague exception made
a nice, symmetrical fit. Conduct could be proscribed yet not
merit the death penalty; this was sufficiently analogous to de-
criminalization of conduct to warrant application to the first
Teague exception.
2. The Exception to Nonretroactivity for Watershed Rules of
Criminal Procedure Without Which the Likelihood of an
Accurate Conviction Is Seriously Diminished
The second exception was phrased in terms of watershed
rules of criminal procedure. This test has two elements: (1) the
rule must be fundamental to the fairness of the proceeding
(hence the metaphor "watershed rules") and (2) the new proce-
dure must enhance the accuracy of the process." Since Teague,
it seems that no case can satisfy both. Where a case has in-
volved the accuracy or integrity of the process," the Court has
found that the procedural rule was not sufficiently "implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty"' to constitute a "watershed
rule[] of criminal procedure."25
In other cases, the new rule cannot meet the requirement
that a new rule implicates the accuracy of the proceeding.
Teague itself supposedly fell within this rubric,26 although one
22. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311-13 (1989).
23. Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227 (1990), involved a prosecutor who mislead the
jury into thinking that they had less responsibility for the sentencing decision than
they actually had. This violated the rule in Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320
(1985). See infra section IV.C. The Sawyer Court said:
It is ... not enough under Teague to say that a new rule is aimed at
improving the accuracy of trial. More is required. A rule that qualifies
under this exception must not only improve accuracy, but also 'alter our
understanding of the bedrock procedural elements' essential to the fair-
ness of a proceeding.
Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 242 (quoting Teague, 489 U.S. at 311) (emphasis added). This
watershed or bedrock procedural rule talisman seems malleable enough to allow the
Supreme Court to deny this second Teague exception to virtually any new rule that
the Court crafts.
24. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692
(1971)).
25. Id. at 311.
26. Justice O'Connor ruled that Teague could meet neither prong of the test.
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can question whether that was necessarily so. The petitioner in
Teague was "a black man... convicted by an all-white jury" of
attempted murder, armed robbery and aggravated battery."
The prosecutor used all of his peremptory challenges to strike
only persons of African-American descent. His explanation that
"he was trying to achieve a balance of men and women on the
jurf 28 "was transparent,"29 a palpable subterfuge. The Su-
prem'e Court's dismissal of the claim as not implicating the
accuracy of the process is either naive or cynical. The racial
composition of a jury can have a profound effect on the out-
come. 0 One commentator has observed that "It]he conviction
[was] tainted with overt racial discrimination.""' Thus, the Su-
preme Court utilized a restricted conception of procedures that
affect the accuracy of the process, as well as a narrow view of
what constitutes a bedrock procedural rule, to achieve the re-
sult in Teague.
The second Teague exception's narrow compass becomes expli-
cable with the Court's opinion in Saffle v. Parks.32 The Court
in Saffle emphasized that "although the precise contours of this
exception may be difficult to discern, we have usually cited
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), holding that a
defendant has the right to be represented by counsel in all
criminal trials for serious offenses, to illustrate the type of rule
Because the absence of a fair cross section on the jury venire does not
undermine the fundamental fairness that must underlie a conviction or
seriously diminish the likelihood of obtaining an accurate conviction, we
conclude that a rule requiring that petit juries be composed of a fair
cross section of the community would not be a 'bedrock procedural
element' that would be retroactively applied under the second exception
we have articulated.
Teague, 489 U.S at 315.
27. Id. at 292.
28. Id. at 293.
29. Friedman, supra note 9, at 808.
30. For example, racial discrimination in death sentences has been wel document-
ed. See, e.g., David C. Baldus et al., Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Admin-
istration of the Death Penalty, 15 STETSON L. REv. 133 (1986); Samuel R. Cross &
Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial Disparities in Capital Sen-
tencing and Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L. REv. 27 (1984); Ronald J. Tabak,
The Execution of Injustice: A Cost and Lack-Of-Benefit Analysis of the Death Penalty,
23 Loy. LA L. REV. 59, 89-93 (1989).
31. Friedman, supra note 9, at 808-809.
32. 494 U.S. 484 (1990).
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coming within the exception."33 This illustration is so re-
strictive that it is no wonder the Teague plurality felt it was
"unlikely that many such components of basic due process have
yet to emerge."34 Other Supreme Court cases dealing with the
second Teague exception run in the same vein."5
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the rule
invalidating state rules that require jury unanimity on a capital
defendant's mitigating evidence was such a bedrock procedural
rule as to fall within the second Teague exception. 6 Because a
denial of certiorari implies nothing concerning the merits of a
lower court decision,37 it is difficult to evaluate the importance
of this case.
The cases demonstrate that the two Teague exceptions are
narrow indeed. Very few cases could qualify under either excep-
tion. This makes the focus on what constitutes a "new rule" for
the purpose of determining when to apply Teague a critical
inquiry.
C. The Definition of "New Rule"
By far the most difficult problem in dealing with the habeas
corpus nonretroactivity doctrine is the determination of whether
resolution of a claim requires the application of a new rule of
law. Can the petition be resolved by applying old law, or must
a new rule be fashioned? The answer to this is not as simple as
it might at first seem. Much depends on how broadly or nar-
rowly a rule is read, and that depends on the criteria for decid-
33. Id. at 495.
34. Teague v. League, 489 U.S. 288, 313 (1989).
35. See, e.g., Gilmore v. Taylor, 113 S. Ct. 2112 (1993); Caspari v. Bohlen, 114 S.
Ct. 948 (1994).
36. Williams v. Dixon, 961 F.2d. 448 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 510
(1992). Douglas Williams, Jr. sought habeas corpus seeking relief from his death
sentence on the ground that he lacked the requisite mental capacity (because of or-
ganic brain damage). After his case became final, the Supreme Court held in McKoy
v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433 (1990) that the jury instruction, also given in the
Williams case, requiring jury unanimity before they could consider a defendant's miti-
gating evidence, was unconstitutional. McKoy constituted a new rule but was entitled
to retroactive application because it fell within the second Teague exception. Willias,
961 F.2d. at 453; see also Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988).
37. ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE § 5.5, 234-36 (7th ed.
1993).
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ing whether the claim comes within the ambit of an old rule.
"While there can be no dispute that a decision announces a
new rule if it expressly overrules a prior decision, 'it is more
difficult... to determine whether we announce a new rule
when a decision extends the reasoning of our prior cases.'"3
The difficulty begins with Teague itself which is offered as
one test but which is clearly two differing 9 tests for determin-
ing whether a rule is new:
It is admittedly often difficult to determine when a case
announces a new rule, and we do not attempt to define the
spectrum of what may or may not constitute a new rule for
retroactivity purposes. In general, however, a case announc-
es a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a new
obligation on the States or the Federal Government. To put
it differently, a case announces a new rule if the result was
not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's
conviction became final.'
As Professor Liebman points out, the first criterion that "a 'new
rule' is one that 'breaks new ground or imposes a new
obligation'-tends towards the end of the spectrum of 'new rule'
definitions occupied by relatively rare overrulings ... and an-
nouncements of rules to govern newly arisen procedural innova-
tions.""'
If that were all that the Teague plurality had said, the case
would have affected only a few habeas cases. Justice Brennan's
dissent focused on the problem created by the "dictated by
precedent" language:
Few decisions on appeal or collateral review are "dictated"
by what came before. Most such cases involve a question of
law that is at least debatable, permitting a rational judge
to resolve the case in more than one way. Virtually no case
38. Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 897 (1983) (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494
U.S. 484, 488 (1990)).
39. One commentator goes firther, calling these "conflicting characterizations."
Professor Liebman, supra note 14, at 244. While this perhaps overstates the matter,
there is at least a pronounced tension in Justice O'Connor's varying attempts to for-
mulate a general test for determining when a rule is new for retroactivity analysis.
40. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
41. Liebman, supra note 14, at 244-45.
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that prompts a dissent on the relevant legal point, for ex-
ample, could be said to be "dictated" by prior decisions. By
the plurality's test, therefore, a great many cases could only
be heard on habeas if the rule urged by the petitioner fell
within one of the two exceptions the plurality has sketched.
Those exceptions, however, are narrow. Rules that place
"'certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct be-
yond the power of the criminal law-making authority to
proscribe'" . . . are rare. And rules that would require "new
procedures without which the likelihood of an accurate
conviction is seriously diminished" . . . are not appreciably
more common ... The plurality's approach today can thus
be expected to contract substantially the Great Writ's
sweep.42
The next decision to address the Teague nonretroactivity
doctrine, Penry v. Lynaugh," ran headlong into the problem of
determining the contours of the "new rule" doctrine. Johnny
Paul Penry was a moderately retarded death row inmate with,
according to one clinical psychologist, the mental age of a six
and one-half year old." His case presented two distinct retro-
activity problems stemming from two substantive issues: (1)
whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of the
mentally retarded; and (2) whether the death sentence violated
the Eighth Amendment "because the jury was not adequately
instructed to consider all of his mitigating evidence"' in im-
posing its sentence. The first issue-the claimed unconstitution-
ality of executing the mentally retarded-would, if resolved in
favor of Penry, create a new rule coming within the first
Teague exception insofar as it took mentally retarded persons
out of the class of individuals who would be eligible for the
death penalty." Because the case fell within the first Teague
exception, the Court addressed the merits and resolved them
against Penry.4
The second issue-the failure of the jury instructions to con-
sider and give effect to the mitigating evidence of retarda-
42. Teague, 489 U.S. at 334 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
43. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
44. Id. at 302.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 330.
47. Id.
312
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tion-provided the more interesting retroactivity problem."
Justice O'Connor restated the rule without noting the potential
difficulty inherent in the "dictated by precedent" language.
Joined by two dissenters and two concurrences from Teague,
the new majority held that the rule sought by Penry was con-
trolled by Lockett v. Ohio49 and Eddings v. Oklahoma,5 ° which
held that a capital sentencer must be allowed to consider all
available mitigating evidence. 1 The mitigating evidence offered
by the defense included Penry's evidence of retardation. The
jury instructions prevented consideration of this evidence."
Since it did not constitute a new rule, but merely applied an
old rule established prior to Penry's conviction becoming final,
he benefited from it and received relief."
This result seems unexceptional. The evidence penetrated the
heart of capital case mitigation evidence, and thereby comports
well with modern post-Furman notions of due process in capital
sentencing. However, it is difficult to conceive that Penry was
dictated by the LockettlEddings line of cases. The Texas capital
sentencing scheme, which included the precise special issues54
addressed by Penry's jury, had been held to be facially constitu-
tional in Jurek v. Texas.55 Penry's holding that the Texas stat-
ute was unconstitutional as applied to Johnny Penry "wiped out
a good part of the effect ... of Jurek and reversed a huge state
48. For many, the Court's treatment of the constitutionality of executing retarded
persons or, alternatively, the right to have their mental disabilities considered at the
sentencing proceeding, constituted the most important issues in Penry. However, the
complexity of the "new rule" analysis, and the draconian nature of a broad sweep in
application, renders this analysis extremely significant to habeas litigators confronted
with the defense that a claim is new, not falling within one of the exceptions, and
therefore, unavailable.
49. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
50. 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
51. Penry, 492 U.S. at 315.
52. Id. The special issues to be answered at the conclusion of a capital sentencing
proceeding in Texas at the time of Penry's trial were: (1) Whether the defendant's
conduct which caused the death was committed deliberately and with a reasonable
expectation that a death would result; (2) Whether there was a probability that the
defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that constitute a continuing threat
to society;, and, (3) If raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in
killing the deceased was an unreasonable response to the provocation, if any, by the
deceased. TEX. CODE CRMI. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(b) (West 1981 & Supp. 1989).
53. Penry, 492 U.S. at 315.
54. TEx. CODE CRIM. PROc. ANN. art. 37.071(b) (West 1981 & Supp. 1989).
55. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
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and lower federal court jurisprudence that did in fact hold that
Jurek permitted the practices the Court disapproved in
Penry."56 If any case seemed to conservative jurists not to be
"dictated by precedent" it was Penry's case. Perhaps this ex-
plains why none of the plurality in Teague joined Justice
O'Connor in the Penry decision. In a bitter riposte, Justice
Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White
and Kennedy, observed: "[i]t is rare that a principle of law as
significant as that in Teague is adopted and gutted in the same
Term."
57
It is hardly surprising that the Supreme Court's conservative
members were unhappy with the outcome in Penry. "[A]nxious
to speed the pace of executions"58 and unhappy with the crimi-
nal and habeas jurisprudence of the Warren Court,59 these ju-
dicial conservatives sought the elimination of most habeas cas-
es.6" The "dictated by precedent" formulation of a new rule
was the perfect subterfuge for eliminating habeas corpus with-
out directly confronting the Habeas Corpus Statute and without
overturning directly the broad substantive rights accorded by
the Warren Court.6 Coupled with the statutory presumption of
correctness for state fact-finding, 2 the nonretroactivity rule
would, if strictly applied, permit only the rarest habeas case to
be heard on the merits in federal court (for example, where a
state court had flagrantly ignored or misapprehended clear
controlling precedent). Penry appeared to undercut the "dictated
by precedent" portion of the Teague "new rule" criteria.
However, in 1990, "dictated by precedent" came back, acquir-
ing fresh force in a novel formulation, in Butler v. McKellar,3
56. Liebman, supra note 14, at 248.
57. Penry, 492 U.S. at 353 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
58. Friedman, supra note 9, at 800.
59. Id. at 820-26.
60. See, e.g., Liebman, supra note 10 passim (arguing that Teague represents an
assault on habeas corpus).
61. See, e.g., Kathleen Patchell, The New Habeas, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 939, 982
(1991) ("With the development of this new retroactivity doctrine, proponents of the
new habeas at last found a means of limiting the substantive scope of habeas with-
out directly attacking the substance of rights.").
62. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1988).
63. 494 U.S. 407 (1990).
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Saffle v. Parks," and Sawyer v. Smith.65 Butler is difficult to
distinguish from Penry. It presents an even stronger case for
the application of "old" precedent, hence available on habeas,
and yet it came to the opposite conclusion.
Horace Butler was arrested and invoked his right to retain
counsel, but was unable to make bond and stayed in jail. While
in jail, he was informed that he was a suspect in an unrelated
murder. Butler made incriminating statements, and was ulti-
mately convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. His
lawyers preserved the claim that his confession violated his
rights under Edwards v. Arizona,66 which required police to
refrain from all interrogation once an accused had invoked the
right to counsel. It is only a slight extension to apply this rule
to one who is in continuous custody under a different charge,
and that is exactly what the Supreme Court did in Arizona v.
Roberson.6" The rule in Roberson came after Butler's case had
become final and was therefore subject to retroactivity analysis.
The Court in Roberson said that Roberson's case was directly
controlled by Edwards. Horace Butler sought application of this
rule that was directly controlled by a rule in effect before his
conviction had become final. Thus, Butler effected less an ex-
tension of existing precedent than did Penry. If Penry had con-
trolled the retroactivity analysis, Horace Butler would have
received relief from his death sentence; however, Butler lost.
The majority held that a rule is dictated by precedent if it "was
susceptible to debate among reasonable minds."68
Here was a formulation of the "new rule" that would, if con-
sistently applied, devour habeas corpus. As long as reasonable
jurists could disagree, a rule was new and unavailable to habe-
as petitioners. The dissent was unusually bitter:
Today, under the guise of fine-tuning the definition of "new
rule," the Court strips state prisoners of virtually any
meaningful federal review of the constitutionality of their
incarceration. A legal ruling sought by a federal habeas
64. 494 U.S. 484 (1990).
65. 497 U.S. 227 (1990).
66. 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
67. 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
68. Penry, 494 U.S. at 415.
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petitioner is now deemed "new" as long as the correctness
of the rule, based on precedent existing when the
petitioner's conviction became final, is "susceptible to debate
among reasonable minds." Put another way, a state prisoner
can secure habeas relief only by showing that the state
court's rejection of the constitutional challenge was so clear-
ly invalid under then-prevailing legal standards that the
decision could not be defended by any reasonable jurist.
With this requirement, the Court has finally succeeded in
its thinly veiled crusade to eviscerate Congress' habeas
corpus regime.69
The dissent explained:
State courts essentially are told today that, save for out-
right "illogical" defiance of a binding precedent precisely on
point, their interpretations of federal constitutional
guarantees-no matter how cramped and unfaithful to the
principles underlying existing precedent-will no longer be
subject to oversight through the federal habeas system.
State prosecutors surely will offer every conceivable basis in
each case for distinguishing our prior precedents, and state
courts will be free to "disregard the plain purport of our
decisions and to adopt a let's-wait-until-it's-decided [by the
Supreme Court] approach.""0
This "new rule" criterion, which defined an "old" rule as that
which all reasonable jurists in the country would find to be
dictated by precedent, stood-for 1990. Saffle v. Parks71 held
that petitioner's contention that the LockettlEddings line of
cases 72 required that the jury be able to base its decision on
the sympathy that the jury feels toward the defendant after
hearing the mitigating evidence would, if adopted, constitute a
new rule. It was, therefore, unavailable to a habeas petitioner.
Sawyer v. Smith," involved prosecutorial misconduct at the
69. Id. at 417 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J., and joined as to
parts I, II, and III by Blackmun and Stevens, JJ.) (citation omitted).
70. Id. at 423.
71. 494 U.S. 484 (1990).
72. The Lockett/Eddings line of cases requires the sentencer in a capital case to
be able to consider in assessing the appropriate sentence any facts in mitigation that
the defendant proffers. See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett
v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
73. 497 U.S. 227 (1990).
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capital trial sentencing stage. Caldwell v. Mississippi,74 held
that a prosecutor's argument at the sentencing phase that di-
minished the jury's sense of responsibility, by telling them that
their decision in imposing death was not final and could be
overridden, violated the Eighth Amendment. This error (now
frequently called "Caldwell error") was held to constitute a new
rule and therefore unavailable on federal habeas corpus.
Teague, as modified by Butler, was now effective to screen out
most claims on habeas corpus.
Given the Butler, Saffle, Sawyer trio, Stringer v. Black,75 is
surprising. Justice Kennedy wrote for a six to three majority
that included Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White and
O'Connor. The Court changed direction again and substantially
narrowed the scope of the "new rule" standard. The petitioner
in Stringer had received a death sentence under a jury instruc-
tion that allowed the jury to impose death if it found that the
murder was "especially heinous, atrocious or cruel."76 A similar
instruction involving the "vileness" predicate" had been held
unconstitutionally vague in Godfrey v. Georgia," which predat-
ed Stringer. The rule in Godfrey had not been applied to the
precise language "heinous, atrocious or cruel" until Maynard v.
Cartwright,79 and this rule had not been applied to a weighing
state" until Clemons v. Mississippi.8 Both Cartwright and
74. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
75. 112 S. Ct. 1130 (1992).
76. Id. at 1134.
77. The "vileness" predicate used in many capital punishment states is the func-
tional equivalent of the "heinous, atrocious or cruel" predicate of other capital punish-
ment states. Each told the jury at the sentencing phase that the death penalty could
be imposed if the jury found that the murder in question were particularly vile (or
heinous).
78. 446 U.S. 420 (1980). The Court in Godfrey held that all murders are vile so
that allowing a jury to impose a death sentence because the murder was especially
vile did not serve to meaningfully distinguish between those few murderers that de-
served execution from the many more ordinary murderers that did not. Thus, the
instruction invited arbitrary decision making and was unconstitutionally vague. Most
states, after the Godfrey, Cartwright, and Clemons line of cases, provided the jury
with narrowing definitions that were designed to cure the vagueness problems associ-
ated with these types of penalty phase instructions. These issues continue to be ag-
gressively litigated because the narrowing constructions themselves give rise to ques-
tions. See, e.g., Jones v. Murray, 976 F.2d. 169 (4th Cir. 1992).
79. 486 U.S. 356 (1988).
80. A weighing state is one in which the jury at the sentencing phase of a capi-
tal trial is required to weigh the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in deter-
1996] 317
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:303
Clemons were decided after the petitioner's case in Stringer had
become final.
Two circumstances favored a determination that extension of
Godfrey to these facts constituted a new rule that would there-
fore be unavailable to petitioner. First, "prior to Clemons, the
issue decided favorably to the defendant in Clemons had been
'express[ly] ... left open.'" 2 Second, before Clemons the Fifth
Circuit had "concluded that Godfrey did not apply to
Mississippi." " It was certainly possible for a reasonable jurist
to distinguish Godfrey on the basis that the issue in Mississippi
remained open at least until Clemons. The supposedly reason-
able jurists of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had in fact
made precisely that distinction in ruling against death-sen-
tenced petitioners on the merits. Yet the Court reversed, find-
ing that extension of Godfrey to Stringer did not create a new
rule, but merely applied the old rule. The Court made short
work of the contrary Fifth Circuit precedent:
The Fifth Circuit's pre-Clemons views are relevant to our
inquiry, but not dispositive. The purpose of the new rule
doctrine is to validate reasonable interpretations of existing
precedents ... The short answer to the State's argument is
that the Fifth Circuit made a serious mistake in [the Evans
and Johnson cases].'
mining whether the defendant is to be executed. Mississippi is such a weighing state,
whereas Georgia is not. In a non-weighing state, such as Georgia or Virginia, the
jury is simply told to consider the aggravating and mitigating circumstances in deter-
mining whether the sentence is to be life or death, but it is not told to weigh those
circumstances to determine if aggravators outweigh mitigators or vice-versa. This may
seem an inconsequential difference, but conceptually a weighing state is different in
that the failure to properly give meaning to a mitigating circumstance could tip the
scales of justice in favor of the state.
81. 494 U.S. 738 (1990).
82. Liebman, supra note 14, at 251 (citations omitted).
83. Stringer v. Black, 112 S. Ct. 1130, 1140 (1992) (citing Evans v. Thigpen, 809
F.2d. 239 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1033 (1987); Johnson v. Thigpen, 806 F.2d.
1243 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 951 (1987)).
84. Id. at 1140. The consequence of the Fifth Circuit's "serious mistake" is that
both Connie Ray Evans and Edward Earl Johnson were executed. NAACP Legal De-
fense and Educational Fund, Inc., Death Row U.S.A. (Summer, 1993) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the University of Richmond Law Review) [hereinafter Death
Row USA].
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Unfortunately for those who seek to understand the Supreme
Court's habeas corpus retroactivity jurisprudence, the Court
continues to reverse direction. If any case appeared to be con-
trolled by the ruling in Penry v. Lynaugh, it was Graham v.
Collins.' Given the Supreme Court's flailing about between
extremes, it is not surprising that Gary Graham lost while
Horace Penry won. The meaning and application of "new rule"
remains elusive.86
Graham received a death sentence in Texas from a jury that
was given the same penalty phase instructions that were given
in Penry's case.8" The only distinction between the two cases
lies in the type of mitigating evidence presented by the two
defendants. Penry had adduced his mental incapacity as a miti-
gating circumstance, and the Court had held that the Texas
special instructions failed to allow jury consideration of this
evidence. Graham presented evidence of his youth and good
character prior to the short-lived crime spree that placed him
on death row.' The majority distinguished Peniy on the basis
that the Texas special instructions failed to permit any consid-
eration of Penry's retardation, while Gary Graham's youth,
relatively good prior character, and the short duration of his
85. 113 S. Ct. 892 (1993).
86. A badly fractured court in Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482 (1992) dealt with
the Teague nonretroactivity doctrine at length in the dicta in the many opinions. The
question presented but not decided was whether the Teague retroactivity doctrine
created a requirement of general deference by habeas courts to all reasonable state
court decisions applying federal law to the facts of particular cases. The Court found
it unnecessary to decide this question. The different opinions dealt with the issue of
the difference between pure legal rules and the application of legal rules to the facts
of particular cases-the issue of mixed questions of law and fact and whether a fed-
eral habeas court should defer to state findings as to such mixed questions of law
and fact. The case is important primarily as an indication of a direction that three
justices would take if they could garner the votes. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Jus-
tices Thomas and Scalia are prepared to adopt a general rule of deference to state
application of law to issues of fact. If that view were to be adopted, habeas corpus as
we know it would be entirely ended. All questions ultimately become mixed questions
of fact and law. A general rule of deference to state court application of law to new
sets of facts would leave federal habeas corpus with no room in which to operate.
Even outright defiance of Supreme Court precedent could be hidden behind factual
predicates, rendering any state court virtually unreviewable. For an excellent exposi-
tion of Wright v. West see James S. Liebman, Apocalypse Next Time?: The Anachro-
nistic Attack On Habeas Corpus/Direct Review Parity, 92 COLuM. L. REv. 1997 (1992).
87. See supra note 52.
88. Graham was 17 at the time of the crimes for which he was convicted and
received the death penalty. Graham, 113 S. Ct. at 896.
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crime spree, could all be considered by the jury in its delibera-
tions on the future dangerousness instruction. 9 This distinc-
tion sufficed to characterize Graham's claim as new and there-
fore unavailable on habeas corpus.9" The dissent, which includ-
ed Justices Souter, Blackmun, Stevens, and the author of
Teague, Justice O'Connor, saw no meaningful distinction
between the two cases and would have granted relief." The
distinction between the zero scope for consideration of Penry's
claim and the de minimis scope in Graham's, allowing consider-
ation of youth and character to be limited to the issue of
whether a person will likely remain dangerous, appears ephem-
eral.9 2
Defendants continue to lose in the Supreme Court on the
Teague "new rule" issue. In Gilmore v. Taylor,93 a noncapital
case, the Supreme Court held that the Seventh Circuit's ruling
in Falconer v. Lane94 was not dictated by precedent.95 There-
fore the holding was new, and hence unavailable to the peti-
89. Id. at 901. It was argued that retardation, far from being a consideration
under the Texas special instructions, actually harmed Pery because under the future
dangerous predicate the retardation would likely be seen as making Penry potentially
less likely to be able to conform his future behaviour to the law and therefore more
likely to be dangerous. Id. at 901. This appears to be the strongest argument for
distinguishing Penry from Graham.
90. Id. at 902.
91. Id. at 917 (Souter, J., dissenting).
92. The majority opinion appears to be little aware of, or unsympathetic to, the
exigencies of trial advocacy in the capital sentencing phase trial. This limitation on
the use of the defendant's youth and background limits the advocate in her effective
representation of the defendant on what often may be the crucial issues of the case.
See, e.g., Alan W. Clarke, Virginia's Capital Murder Sentencing Proceeding: A Defense
Perspective, 18 U. RICH. L. REv. 341 (1984).
93. 113 S. Ct. 2112 (1993).
94. 905 F.2d. 1129 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that jury instructions regarding mur-
der and voluntary manslaughter violated constitutional strictures because they allowed
the jury to return a guilty of murder verdict without considering whether defendant
possessed the requisite mental state).
95. Gilmore, 113 S. Ct. at 2116 ("[P]ut meaningfully for the majority of cases, a
decision announces a new rule 'if the result was not dictated by precedent existing at
the time the defendant's conviction became final.'" (citations omitted)).
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tioner on habeas corpus.96 Recently, in Caspari v. Bohlen"
the Court ruled that the extension of the rule in Bullington v.
Missouri9' would, if applied in a non-capital case, constitute a
new rule that would be unavailable to a petitioner on federal
habeas corpus. Not surprisingly, lower federal courts have expe-
rienced difficulty in applying the Teague "new rule" criterion.99
Lawyers working in this area can find recent precedent to sup-
port almost any position.
D. Teague Applied
1. The Types of Cases Subject to the Nonretroactivity Bar
The converse of the nonretroactivity bar in collateral review
obtains on direct review where new constitutional rules are
applied to all cases that are not final as of the decision an-
nouncing the new rule."0 In Johnson v. Texas,' the Court
96. The majority in Gilmore said: "Outside of the capital context, we have never
said that the possibility of a jury misapplying state law gives rise to federal constitu-
tional error." 113 S. Ct at 2117. One report points out that Gilmore v. Taylor by
rejecting petitioner's attempt to use a rule at too great a "level of generality" creates
a dilemma for a habeas petitioner. WILLIAM J. STUNTZ & JOSEPH L. HOFFMAN, ISSUES
IN CAPrrAL PUNISHmENT (1993) (prepared for The United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit).
If a petitioner who tries to rely on an "old" decision describes its "rule"
too narrowly, then the habeas court may conclude that the decision does
not really "dictate" the result the petitioner seeks in his own case . . .if
the petitioner describes the "rule" more broadly, so as to clearly encom-
pass his own claim, then (as in Taylor) the habeas court may conclude
that the description is too "general" to provide "meaningful guidance" for
Teague purposes.
STUNTz & HOFFMAN, supra, at 185.
97. 114 S. Ct. 948 (1994).
98. 451 U.S. 430 (1981). Bulington held "that a defendant sentenced to life im-
prisonment following a trial-like capital sentencing proceeding is protected by the
Double Jeopardy Clause against imposition of the death penalty if he obtains reversal
of his conviction and is retried an reconvicted." Caspari, 114 S. Ct. at 951.
99. After reviewing many dozens of lower court decisions, Professor Liebman con-
cluded that "[a] review of circuit court decisions applying Teague reveals little to
distinguish the rules that have been denominated 'new' from those deemed to be
'dictated by precedent.'" Indeed, it is becoming increasingly commonplace to find inter-
or intra-circuit conflicts as to whether a particular rule is or is not 'new'." Liebman,
supra note 14, at 258-60.
100. Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 (1987). Justice Powell, concurring in Grif-
fith, presaged the rule in Teague: "It is to be hoped that the Court . .. will adopt
the Harlan view of retroactivity in cases seeking relief on habeas petitions." Id. at
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confronted the issue left open because of the nonretroactivity
bar in Graham v. Collins 02-- whether the Texas special in-
structions 1 3 violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments
by allowing insufficient consideration of a capital defendant's
youth and background. Because the issue arose on direct review
the Teague "new rule" retroactivity bar did not apply. In a five
to four decision the Court ruled that the Texas statute passed
constitutional muster.' Penry's rule invalidating the Texas
special jury instructions as applied, and requiring that mitigat-
ing evidence of mental retardation be considered in a capital
sentencing proceeding, was narrowly limited to its facts."°5 In
Powell v. Nevada,0 6 the majority found on direct appeal that
the rule requiring that a judicial probable cause hearing gener-
ally be held within forty-eight hours of a warrantless arrest,
while new, would be applied retroactively, and the case was
remanded to the state court for further proceedings. Thus,
Teague's retroactivity bar applies only to habeas corpus peti-
tions; it does not apply to cases on direct review.
Teague left open the question of whether the nonretroactivity
bar would apply to capital cases."7 Penry v. Lynaugh,'° ap-
plied the rule to death penalty cases "without the benefit of
briefing or oral argument."'
A number of problems in applying the nonretroactivity rule
remain unresolved. The rule's application to new statutory
criminal rulings and application to federal prisoner proceedings
under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 have not been resolved."' The rule
329 (Powell, J. concurring) (citation omitted).
101. 113 S. Ct. 2658 (1993).
102. 113 S. Ct. 892 (1993).
103. See supra note 52.
104. Johnson, 113 S. Ct. 2658 (1993). Once again Justice O'Connor, who had pre-
vailed in Teague and Penry, dissented. Id. at 2672 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 2667-68.
106. 114 S. Ct. 1280 (1994).
107. Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion stated: "Because petitioner is not under
sentence of death, we need not, and do not, express any views as to how the retroac-
tivity approach we adopt today is to be applied in the capital sentencing context."
Teague, 489 U.S. at 314 n.2.
108. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
109. Id. at 342 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by
Marshall, J.).
110. See, e.g., Liebman, supra note 14, at 214-16.
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was cited in a civil case which held that a new rule must be
given retroactive effect to all cases still open on direct re-
view.' This leads one to speculate what, if any, application
Teague may have in civil cases.
2. At What Point Must Retroactivity Analysis be Conducted?
The plurality in Teague stated that "[r]etroactivity is properly
treated as a threshold question, for, once a new rule is applied
to the defendant in the case announcing the rule, evenhanded
justice requires that it be applied retroactively to all who are
similarly situated."" Critics of the approach take pains to
point out that this was not a holding of the Court because it
was not joined by the concurring fifth vote of Justice White,
and that there are many good reasons for not treating retroac-
tivity analysis as a threshold question."' The Supreme Court,
however, has treated the matter as decided and ordinarily has
applied the nonretroactivity bar as a threshold matter." It
seems reasonable to assume that retroactivity analysis will
continue to be treated as a threshold matter.
3. Is Teague Itself Retroactive?
Teague was retroactively applied not only to the petitioner in
Teague, but also to the petitioners in Penry v. Lynaugh, Zant v.
Moore, Butler v. McKellar, Saffle v. Parks, and Sawyer v.
Smith."5 Retroactive application of the nonretroactivity rule
has itself been criticized for "[v]iolating their own expressions of
111. Harper v. Virginia Dep't of Taxation, 113 S. Ct. 2510 (1993).
112. 489 U.S. at 300.
113. Liebman, supra note 14, at 231-42.
114. Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 892, 897 (1993). ("Because this case is before
us on Graham's petition for a writ of federal habeas corpus, we must determine, as a
threshold matter, whether granting him the relief he seeks would create a 'new rule'
of constitutional law." (citations omitted)); see also Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37,
40 (1990) ("Generally speaking, '[rietroactivity is properly treated as a threshold
question' . . . ").
115. Liebman, supra note 14, at 284 n.3 (citing Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227
(1990), Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1990), Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407 (1990),
Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989), and Zant v. Moore, 489 U.S. 836 (1989)).
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concern that similarly situated habeas corpus petitioners should
not be treated differently,"" 6 and for creating a novel rule
that could not have been anticipated by either petitioners or
their lawyers when drafting pleadings.
4. Can the State Waive Teague?
In Teague, Penry and Saffle v. Parks, the Court raised the
retroactivity issue sua sponte,"7 thus stimulating the question
of whether, and if so when, the issue of retroactivity analysis
could be waived or forfeited by the state. In Collins v.
Youngblood,"' the Court held that the nonretroactivity rule
was not jurisdictional and, therefore, where the state chooses
not to rely on the doctrine, the Court has no duty to raise and
decide the issue sua sponte. The Court made the rule explicit
in Godinez v. Moran,"' which said:
Although this case comes to us by way of federal habeas
corpus, we do not dispose of it on the ground that the
heightened competency standard is a 'new rule' for purposes
of Teague v. Lane ... because petitioner did not raise a
Teague defense in the lower courts or in his petition for
certiorari.2 '
Godinez was anticipated by the Circuit Courts of Appeal.'2'
116. Id. at 284.
117. STUNTZ & HOFFMAN, supra note 96, at 198.
118. 497 U.S. 37, 41 (1990).
119. 113 S. Ct. 2680 (1993).
120. Id. at 2685 n.8 (citations omitted).
121. See, e.g., Epperly v. Booker, 997 F.2d. 1, 9 n.7 (4th Cir. 1993) ("Apparently
for the first time on this appeal, the state proposes that Epperly's Brady claim, and
his prosecutorial misconduct claim... are barred by Teague v. Lane.. .. The
Teague defense appears nowhere in the governments pleadings.... Consequently, we
deem the defense waived." (citations omitted)); See also Williams v. Dixon, 961 F.2d.
448 (4th Cir. 1992)
This case also presents the question of whether a state's failure to raise
Teague in the court below waives it as a defense. Our reading of the
Court's statements of the role of Teague, our consideration of the hold-
ings of our sister circuits, and our recent decision ... lead us to con-
clude that Teague's retroactivity analysis is not jurisdictional in nature
and is an affirmative defense that must be asserted below or else be
waived.
Id. at 456. Contra Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 888 F.2d. 1286 (10th Cir. 1989).
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The two most recent cases involving a state's failure to raise
and preserve the nonretroactivity issue create a mixed signal
from the Supreme Court. In Schiro v. Farley,2 the Court
held that where the state failed to raise the Teague argument
either in the lower courts or in its brief in opposition to the
petition for a writ of certiorari, the issue was waived. The
Court proceeded to address the merits." A state may not
wait until the case is before the Court on the merits before
raising the doctrine. The Court in Caspari v. Bohlen' treated
the nonretroactivity issue as a necessary predicate to the issue
presented in the petition for certiorari even though it was not
explicitly raised therein. The state had argued the
nonretroactivity principle in the courts below and in the briefs
on the merits. The majority addressed the issue despite the
arguable violation of the Court's Rule 14.1(a). Justice Stevens,
in dissent, noted the "harsh rules regarding waiver and claim
forfeiture [rules used to] defeat substantial constitutional
claims"' and concluded that the state's failure to comply
with the Supreme Court's Rules ought to have been as fatal to
the state as a similar misstep would have been to a prisoner
petitioner. 6 While a state's failure to raise and preserve the
Teague issue may cause it to lose the claim, the state will not
be treated as harshly as other litigants.
5. Finality
Ordinarily a claim is final for retroactivity analysis when
"the time for filing a petition for certiorari from the judgment
affirming [the] conviction [has] expired."2 If petitioner seeks
certiorari in the Supreme Court, the case is not final until the
Court denies certiorari.2 This rule is comprehensible enough
in the ordinary case. However, certain claims, such as a claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel,' cannot effectively be
122. 114 S. Ct. 783 (1994).
123. Petitioner, who was death sentenced, lost on the merits of his double jeopardy
argument.
124. 114 S. Ct. 948 (1994).
125. Id. at 957 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
126. Id.
127. Graham v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 898, 892 (1993).
128. Johnson v. Texas, 113 S. Ct. 2658, 2674 (1993) (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
129. See Alan W. Clarke, Procedural Labyrinths and the Injustice of Death: A Cri-
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raised until after the direct appeals have run their course and
the petitioner has had an opportunity to raise the claim in the
postconviction process. The issue of whether the ordinary rule
of finality applies in these cases has not been addressed by the
Supreme Court. Professor Liebman argues persuasively that
there are a number of such claims that cannot, and should not
be treated as final for retroactivity analysis until after the peti-
tioner has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
claims. 30 Another situation untouched by Teague would be
where the new rule was established by the Supreme Court be-
fore the case became final in the state court system. In that
instance a federal habeas court would be free to apply the new
rule to the petitioner's case notwithstanding the outcome in the
state court system.
6. Does Teague Apply to the State?
Teague is a one-way street; its harsh bar applies only to
prisoners. Lockhart v. Fretwell3' involved a claim of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel for failure to raise an issue that
would have been good at the time of petitioner's trial. The
substantive rule changed after the conviction had become final.
The district court and the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
found that counsel's failure to assert the rule at trial and on
direct appeal constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. This
put the state in the awkward position of having to argue for
the application of a new rule on appeal to the Supreme Court.
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, held that, while
counsel had been ineffective in failing to assert the favorable
rule, no prejudice flowed from that failure.'32 This prompted
Justices Stevens and Blackmun to assert in dissent:
An even-handed approach to retroactivity would seem to
require that we continue to evaluate defendants' claims
under the law as it stood at the time of trial. If, under
tique of Death Penalty Habeas Corpus (pt.1), 29 U. RICH. L. REv. 1327 (1995) (ex-
plaining the meaning of ineffective assistance of counsel) [hereinafter Clarke (pt.1)].
130. Liebman, supra note 14, at 270-76.
131. 113 S. Ct. 838 (1993). For a full exposition of this case see Clarke (pt. 1),
supra note 129, at 1356.
132. Lockhart, 113 S. Ct. at 841.
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Teague, a defendant may not take advantage of subsequent
changes in the law when they are favorable to him, then
there is no self-evident reason why a State should be able
to take advantage of subsequent changes in the law when
they are adverse to his interests.1"
The dissent went on to charge:
A rule that generally precludes defendants from taking
advantage of post-conviction changes in the law, but allows
the State to do so, cannot be reconciled with this Court's
duty to administer justice impartially. Elementary fairness
dictates that the Court should evaluate respondent's ineffec-
tive assistance claim under the law as it stood when he was
convicted and sentenced ....
The majority responded to this by asserting that the finality
concerns upon which Teague was based are not concerns in
which the petitioner has any interest, and therefore the reasons
underpinning the nonretroactivity rule did not apply when the
state was asserting the new rule. Justice Rehnquist rejoined
that "[t]his result is not, as the dissent would have it, a
'windfalr for the State, but instead is a perfectly logical limita-
tion of Teague to the circumstances which gave rise to it.
Cessnante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex. ""' 5
E. Conclusion
The Supreme Court has fashioned a highly restrictive proce-
dural barrier in its nonretroactivity rule that threatens to end
habeas corpus. The rule has not been consistently applied and
has led to unjust results. It is not compelled by precedent and
appears to be contrary to the spirit of Congress' habeas corpus
regime.
133. Id- at 852 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
134. Id. at 853.
135. Id. at 844. One ought to question whether the Latin phrase means anything
in this context.
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V. PROCEDURAL DEFAULT
A. Part One: The Basics
1. Introduction
a. The Problem-Forfeiture of Constitutional Claims in Federal
Habeas Corpus Because of the Failure to Timely Assert a
Claim in a State Criminal Proceeding
Most state criminal justice systems utilize procedural rules
designed to force early resolution of issues. The contemporane-
ous objection rule is an example; it requires counsel to state
objections at the point of the alleged error. The penalty for
failure to timely assert an objection is forfeiture of the is-
sue. 3' For example, if one party elicits objectionable hearsay,
the opposing side must promptly object, or lose the objection.
This rule aids in the orderly presentation of evidence, prevents
defense counsel from attempting to create error in the record by
"sandbagging" with objections, and it allows a court to promptly
cure error.
Another example of such a procedural rule posits that only
error assigned on appeal will be heard. The general rubric
136. For example, in Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), the Supreme Court
confronted a procedural default caused by counsel's failure to contemporaneously ob-
ject to the admission of inculpatory statements allegedly made in violation of the
Miranda rule. The prisoner Sykes attacked his conviction for the first time on state
post-conviction review, alleging that his confession had been involuntarily obtained.
The state of Florida refused to entertain Syke's belated claims in state post-conviction
proceedings, apparently because of the violation of the state's contemporaneous
rule-the claim had not been presented to the trial court at the appropriate point in
Syke's trial. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the state courts to hear the
merits of the contention. The state appealed that order and the Supreme Court re-
jected the Fay v. Noia deliberate by-pass rule in federal habeas corpus absent a
showing of "cause" and "prejudice" (terms which are discussed in more detail below).
The petitioner could not meet this more demanding standard in that he was not able
to show either "cause" or "prejudice" for the default and was unable to obtain relief
that may have been available under the less demanding rule of Fay v. Noia. While
these rules are common in the U.S., they are apparently unknown in Canada, where
counsel's failure to object is only one of several factors taken into account in deter-
mining whether to grant an appeal. Interview with Professor Allan Manson, Faculty
of Law, Queen's University in Kingston, Ontario (May 1, 1994). This undercuts the
argument that such rules are necessary to promote the finality of judgments and the
corresponding efficiency of the judicial process.
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"procedural default" covers all such forfeitures; an issue is
procedurally defaulted (forfeited) if not timely and properly
asserted.
Different states enforce forfeiture rules with varying degrees
of force in capital cases. 137 To what extent must a federal ha-
beas court honor a state's procedural-default rule and refuse to
adjudicate the merits? The problem, while not peculiar to the
death penalty, has particular force where someone is executed
notwithstanding constitutional errors which cannot be reviewed
on the merits because counsel failed to raise and preserve the
issue.
b. Background to Procedural Default
Two historical trends coalesced to make this issue important:
(1) the expansion of federal habeas corpus to reach constitution-
al claims by state prisoners, and (2) the expansion of the Due
Process clause incorporating the first eight amendments of the
Bill of Rights. Brown v. Allen 13' held that all constitutional
claims made applicable to state prisoners under the Fourteenth
Amendment are cognizable on federal habeas corpus, once the
claims have been exhausted in the state court system. This
expanded the scope of federal habeas corpus to reach many
state prisoners with federal constitutional claims. In turn, this
made acute the problem of when, and to what extent, a state
court's refusal to address the merits of a constitutional issue
because of a procedural default would also bar the federal habe-
as court from addressing those same merits.
137. Virginia, for example, has extremely stringent procedural-default rules that
apply with equal force in both capital and noncapital cases. See, e.g., Smith v.
Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986). Smith v. Murray was a death penalty case where a
constitutional issue was raised at trial, but omitted on appeal. Counsel relied on an
aberrant Supreme Court of Virginia decision and failed to appreciate the merit of the
issue, involving a confession made to a psychiatrist which was later used at the pen-
alty phase to prove future dangerousness. The error was raised on appeal only by
amici curiae, and was thereby forfeited. See also Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct.
2546 (1991), where a one-day late appellate filing by counsel who misunderstood an
ambiguous rule constituted a procedural default in a capital appeal. In contradistinc-
tion, Kentucky allows appellate review of unpreserved issues in death penalty cases
unless trial counsel failed to object for reason of trial tactics. Ice v. Commonwealth,
667 S.W. 671, 674 (Ky. 1984).
138. 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
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In 1963, the Court in Fay v. Noia"9 held that the "ade-
quate and independent" state law ground preventing direct
Supreme Court review of a state court judgment would not be
extended to federal habeas corpus. 4 ° Federal habeas corpus
could reach constitutional claims arising from state criminal
proceedings notwithstanding a procedural default-except where
the prisoner had deliberately by-passed the state courts. Unless
the state prisoner had made a tactical decision not to raise a
constitutional issue in the state court system, the federal habe-
as court could entertain the issue. Inadvertent defaults were
not fatal to the constitutional claim on habeas corpus, but
knowing waivers were fatal.
The Warren Court's expansion of substantive criminal rights
was given meaning through the habeas corpus remedy. Not
everyone was happy with these developments, and political
pressure built to appoint more conservative Justices to the
Supreme Court. With the more conservative judicial philosophy
of the Burger and then Rehnquist Court came pressure to re-
duce the ambit of the Warren Court's decisions. The Court did
this, not by directly confronting the Warren Court's substantive
rights creation, but by limiting those rights by eliminating the
procedural remedy. Fay's deliberate by-pass standard for excus-
ing a procedural default became one of the first and most im-
portant of the Warren Court's procedural innovations to fall.
2. The More Restrictive "Cause and Prejudice" Standard for
Excusing a Procedural Default Replaces the "Deliberate By-
Pass" Standard
Deliberate by-pass did not expire at once; it was replaced in
evolutionary stages by a rule that required a habeas petitioner
139. 372 U.S. 391 (1963) overruled by Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
140. Id. at 428-430. The Supreme Court in its certiorari review of state appellate
decisions declines "to review state court judgments which rest on independent and
adequate state grounds, notwithstanding the copresence of federal grounds." Id. at
428. Thus, Noia's default, "if deemed adequate and independent ... would cut off
review by this Court of the coram nobis proceeding in which the New York Court of
Appeals refused him relief." Id. at 429. The Court in Fay v. Noia reasoned that this
only applied to the Supreme Court in its appellate function and not to the lower
federal habeas courts or the Supreme Court in review of those lower federal habeas
courts.
330 [Vol. 30:303
DEATH PENALTY HABEAS CORPUS
to show cause for the default and prejudice stemming there-
from. Fay v. Noia' involved the failure to appeal a life sen-
tence, obtained through a coerced confession, where a successful
appeal resulting in a new trial might ultimately have netted
petitioner a death sentence. Because of this "grisly choice,"
these facts permitted a narrow construction, but Fay's broad
language appeared applicable to all procedural defaults.
In 1975, the Court carved exceptions to "deliberate by-pass"
but did not explicitly replace the rule. Francis v. Henderson'
extended the rule requiring federal prisoners seeking collateral
relief to show cause and prejudice for failure to timely chal-
lenge grand jury composition' to state prisoners seeking fed-
eral habeas corpus.' Accordingly, challenges alleging failure
to follow either a state or the federal rule concerning grand
jury composition could not proceed unless the claim met the
cause and prejudice standard. Estelle v. Williams' denied re-
lief where neither petitioner nor counsel objected to petitioner's
wearing jail garb in a jury trial. However, there was evidence
that the trial judge would have granted a request for defendant
to be tried while wearing ordinary clothing. This made the
failure to object appear particularly inexcusable, thus allowing
one to interpret the case as a narrow exception to Fay v. Noia.
Estelle may have seemed fact-bound, but it presaged more
sweeping changes. Again, the standard applied was "cause and
prejudice."
Wainwright v. Sykes' took a larger chunk out of Fay be-
cause it involved a violation of Florida's contemporaneous objec-
tion rule (failure to timely challenge the voluntariness of a
confession).' The Court rejected "the sweeping language of
141. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
142. 425 U.S. 536 (1975).
143. Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973) (failure to timely challenge grand
jury composition forfeits collateral relief absent cause for relief).
144. Justice Brennan foretold Fay v. Noia's demise: "this holding portends one of
two inevitable consequences-either the overruling of Fay or the denigration of the
right to a constitutionally composed grand jury." Francis, 425 U.S. at 546 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
145. 425 U.S. 501 (1975).
146. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
147. Id. at 74.
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Fay" and held that federal habeas review was barred because of
the procedural default "absent a showing of 'cause' and 'preju-
dice."" Sykes did not define "cause and prejudice," stating
"only that it is narrower than the standard set forth in dicta in
Fay v. Noia."' Sykes also enigmatically created a "miscar-
riage of justice" exception to the cause and prejudice rule, but
refused to define this further, saying only that petitioner did
not qualify. 5 ' Later cases have limited "miscarriage of justice"
to require a showing that a constitutional violation has resulted
in the conviction of one who is actually innocent.' 5'
Engle v. Issac"' involved a violation of Ohio's contempora-
neous objection rule; it cemented the Sykes "cause and preju-
dice" rule by rejecting petitioner's proposed limitation "to cases
in which the constitutional error did not affect the truth-finding
function of the trial."5 ' Engle v. Issac also refused to "replace
or supplement the cause-and-prejudice standard with a plain-
error inquiry." Even clear error fails to circumvent the rigid
Sykes cause and prejudice rule, nor does it constitute a miscar-
riage of justice.' Because the petitioners in Engle v. Issac
had failed to show cause for the default, the Court found it
unnecessary to address prejudice.'56
In 1991, the Court finally overruled Fay v. Noia in Coleman
v. Thompson.'57 The current standard for evaluating applica-
tion of a state's procedural bar in federal habeas corpus em-
ploys Sykes cause and prejudice test supplemented by a limited
"miscarriage of justice" (actual innocence) test.
148. Id. at 87.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 91.
151. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 495-96 (1986). This also includes the odd
concept of innocence of the death penalty. See infra section V.A6.b.; Sawyer v. Whit-
ley, 112 S. Ct. 2514 (1992). The standard of proof for an innocence claim is "by clear
and convincing evidence." Sawyer, 112 S. Ct. at 2525.
152. 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
153. Id. at 129.
154. Id. at 134.
155. The miscarriage of justice exception is discussed below in section VIA6.6.
156. 456 U.S. at 133.
157. 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
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3. The Meaning of "Cause"
In Murray v. Carrier5 the Supreme Court defined "cause"
in two ways. First, attorney negligence not amounting to inef-
fective assistance of counsel 59 does not constitute cause to
avoid the bar of a procedural default."6 Second, "cause" can
be established if petitioner can show "some external impedi-
ment preventing counsel from constructing or raising the
claim." 6' Neither test could be met by petitioner where his
lawyer had failed to include the claim on appeal.'62
While ineffective assistance of counsel constituted a well
developed, if restrictive, doctrine, by 1986 the other avenue for
establishing cause-that an "objective factor external to the
defense impeded counsers efforts"' 63-remained ill-defined:
Without attempting an exhaustive catalog of such objective
impediments to compliance with a procedural rule, we note
that a showing that the factual or legal basis for a claim
was not reasonably available to counsel... or that "some
interference by officials" . . . made compliance impracticable,
would constitute cause under this standard."'
4. The Prejudice Prong
United States v. Frady" is the only issue forfeiture case to
turn' on the meaning of "prejudice."'67 Joseph Frady col-
158. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
159. The test for ineffective assistance of counsel was established by Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See Clarke (pt. 1), supra note 129, at 1356 (ex-
plaining the doctrine of ineffective assistance of course).
160. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488.
161. Id. at 492.
162. These tests were applied to capital cases in Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527
(1986).
163. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488.
164. Id. (quoting Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 486 (1953)) (citations omitted).
Both methods of establishing cause are discussed below in section V.A.6.
165. 456 U.S. 152 (1982).
166. Other Supreme Court cases to discuss the term "prejudice" did not turn di-
rectly on the point. See, e.g., Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 484 (1986) (finding an
absence of cause and following Engle v. Issac in rejecting the proposition that actual
prejudice could permit relief in the absence of cause); Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 12
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laborated on a brutal murder, denied complicity at trial, and
was sentenced to death upon overwhelming evidence. He es-
caped electrocution in a five to four decision by the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals that left Frady resentenced to life
imprisonment. Now a federal prisoner,' he "began a long se-
ries of collateral attacks"'69 under the federal prisoner habeas
corpus statute. 7 ° The Court of Appeals applied the "plain er-
ror" standard of review to an erroneous jury instruction and
remanded for a new trial or entry of a conviction of a lesser of-
fense. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the correct
standard for reviewing a federal prisoner's defaulted claim on
collateral attack was the Sykes "cause and prejudice" standard
rather than the "plain error" standard.'72
The Court felt no need to address cause "because [it was]
confident he [had] suffered no actual prejudice sufficient to
justify collateral relief 19 years after his crime."'7 A petition-
er must show "not merely that the errors ... created a possi-
bility of prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and sub-
stantial disadvantage, infecting his entire trial with error of
constitutional dimensions.""7 The jury instruction in Frady's
case erroneously defined "malice," which prevented the possibili-
ty of a manslaughter conviction; thus, Frady had not defended
on the basis of a lesser offense involving an absence of mal-
ice-he had denied complicity despite overwhelming evidence of
guilt.' Thus, the erroneous instruction could not have preju-
diced Frady.
(1984) (conceding the existence of prejudice).
167. The prejudice concept is also used with ineffective assistance of counsel
claims. One can look to this for other applications of the prejudice prong of cause
and prejudice.
168. The District of Columbia is not within any state and is therefore subject
solely to federal law and federal court jurisdiction.
169. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 157 (1982).
170. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1988).
171. The plain error rule, FED. R. CRIM. p. 52(b), applies to direct federal prisoner
appeals and allows "courts of appeals the latitude to correct particularly egregious
errors on appeal regardless of a defendant's trial default: 'Plain errors or defects
affecting substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the
attention of the court.'" Frady, 456 U.S. at 163 (quoting FED. R. Crtm p. 52(b)).
172. Frady, 456 U.S. at 166.
173. Id. at 167.
174. Id. 170.
175. Id. at 171.
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The Sykes prejudice prong was narrowly construed. In anoth-
er formulation of the standard, the Frady Court adopted lan-
guage from a dissent by Justice Stevens, which summarized the
degree of prejudice necessary for obtaining collateral relief from
an erroneous jury charge as "whether the ailing instruction by
itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction
violated due process,' not merely whether 'the instruction is
undesirable, erroneous, or even universally condemned."" 6 In
Murray v. Carrier7 the Court narrowly confined "pervasive
actual prejudice" to a "showing that prisoner was denied 'funda-
mental fairness' at trial."' 8
Few issues which have been procedurally defaulted can es-
cape forfeiture under the dual cause and prejudice tests."'9
Failure to meet either test bars the claim.8 ° Engle v.
Issac '8 found cause lacking and therefore did not address
prejudice, while Frady only addressed prejudice.'82
5. The Plain Statement Rule-How a Federal Habeas Court
Determines Whether State Courts Have Enforced a Procedural
Bar
Deciding whether a state court has barred merits review of a
constitutional claim under its procedural rules is easy when the
state's highest appellate court expressly relies on a procedural
rule to avoid addressing the merits. In that circumstance, the
federal habeas court need only read the state court's opinion to
determine the existence of a procedural default. Issue preclu-
sion follows, absent an exception.
176. Id. at 169 (quoting Henderson v. Kibbe, 431 U.S. 145, 154 (1974) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
177. 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
178. I& at 494.
179. A few lower court decisions finding sufficient prejudice to meet the Sykes
standard are collected in IRA P. ROBBINS, HABEAS CoRPus CHECKLISTS § 12.05 at 12-
44 to 12-45 (1994).
180. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 494 (citing Engle v. Issac, 456 U.S. 107, 134
n.43 (1982)).
181. 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
182. United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 167 (1982).
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The problem becomes more difficult when the federal habeas
court confronts an ambiguous or silent state court order. The
Supreme Court stated in Harris v. Reed" that "a procedural
default does not bar consideration of a federal claim unless the
last state court rendering a judgment in the case 'clearly and
expressly states that its judgment rests on a state procedural
bar.""'  This was the "plain statement" rule of Michigan v.
Long,"8 translated from its direct appeal context to collateral
review. While state reliance on a procedural default must be
explicit, it need not be exclusive; alternative holdings that rely
on a procedural bar and reject the federal claim on the merits
suffice to preclude merits review.i8 State prisoners, including
death row inmates, sought to avoid issue preclusion where
summary or formulary state court denials of appeal failed to
specify grounds. The Supreme Court responded by limiting the
plain statement rule. In Coleman v. Thompson,87 state habeas
counsel failed to perfect the appeal by missing a filing deadline.
The state's Attorney General moved to dismiss, arguing that
the missed deadline violated a state procedural rule. The Su-
preme Court of Virginia dismissed the appeal in a one sentence
order. The United States Supreme Court distinguished Harris
v. Reed, finding that even though the order did not plainly
state its reliance on procedural default, it appeared to be predi-
cated on state law because it came in response to the state's
motion seeking dismissal on that basis. Justice Blackmun in
dissent argued:
One searches the majority opinion in vain, however, for any
mention of petitioner Coleman's right to a criminal proceed-
ing free from constitutional defect or his interest in finding
a forum for his constitutional challenge to his conviction
and sentence of death.... Rather, displaying obvious exas-
peration with the breadth of substantive habeas doctrine
and the expansive protection afforded by the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of fundamental fairness in state
criminal proceedings, the Court today continues its crusade
to erect petty procedural barriers in the path of any state
183. 489 U.S. 255 (1989).
184. Id. at 263 (quoting Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 327 (1985)).
185. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
186. Harris, 489 U.S. at 264 n.10.
187. 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
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prisoner seeking review of his federal constitutional claims.
Because I believe that the Court is creating a byzantine
morass of arbitrary, unnecessary, and unjustifiable impedi-
ments to the vindication of federal rights, I dissent.'
Ylst v. Nunnemaker89 further limited the plain statement
rule. In Ylst, a lower state court applied a procedural bar, and
later appellate courts affirmed without stating grounds. The
Supreme Court held that "where ... the last reasoned opinion
on the claim explicitly imposes a procedural default, we will
presume that a later decision rejecting the claim did not silent-
ly disregard that bar and consider the merits."9 '
Although not directly related to this point, Teague also ad-
dressed the plain statement rule. The plain statement rule
assumes that the state court had "the opportunity to address a
claim that is later raised in a federal habeas proceeding. It is
simply inapplicable.., where the case was never presented to
the state courts." 9' The petitioner may, however, have failed
to exhaust the claim.
While Colemnan, Ylst, and Teague, limit the plain statement
rule, if a state chooses to address the merits of a claim despite
a procedural default then the federal habeas court will also
address the merits.9 ' Thus, a federal habeas court may ad-
dress a procedurally defaulted issue wherever the state has
overlooked the default and addressed the merits.
6. Are There Avenues of Relief from Procedural Default?
a. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Ineffective assistance of counsel supplies cause for a proce-
dural default"9 and constitutes an independent Sixth Amend-
188. 501 U.S. at 758 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
189. 501 U.S. 797 (1991).
190. Id. at 803.
191. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 299 (1989).
192. Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 265 n.12 (1989).
193. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986).
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ment violation under Strickland v. Washington... that carries
its own prejudice component.'95 If counsel were constitutional-
ly ineffective in procedurally defaulting a claim, petitioner
would be entitled to relief. Relief is seldom granted on this
ground.'96 A death-sentenced prisoner with potentially merito-
rious but defaulted claims, loses little by claiming that lawyer
incompetence caused the default.'97
One issue-the double or compound procedural de-
fault-arises only in the procedural default area. In Justus v.
Murray,9 ' defense counsel defaulted a number of claims on
direct appeal. Habeas counsel attempted unsuccessfilly, among
other things, to cure the defaulted claims by alleging that inef-
fective assistance of counsel created the defaults. Habeas coun-
sel neglected to appeal the ineffective assistance claim, thereby
defaulting it. The now defaulted ineffective assistance claim
could no longer supply cause for the earlier trial defaults.
Ineffective assistance of counsel is often brought for the first
time at state post-conviction proceedings. This allows a state
trial court to hear evidence concerning original trial counsel's
acts, omissions, and her reasons (or lack thereof) for those ac-
tions. The failure to appeal adverse findings on the ineffective-
assistance claim can create a double default; defaulted trial
issues cannot be cured via later-defaulted ineffective-assistance
claims stemming from the state habeas appeal. This rule cre-
ates a trap for the unwary habeas counsel in an area that, in
any event, rarely affords relief from the issue-preclusion bar of
procedural default.
b. Innocence of the Death Penalty
The "miscarriage of justice" exception to Sykes' cause and
prejudice rule became a narrow requirement that a habeas
petitioner prove actual innocence. Other types of constitutional
194. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
195. Id. at 693.
196. See, e.g., Turner v. Williams, 812 F. Supp. 1400 (E.D. Va. 1993) (holding that
the assistance of counsel was not sufficiently ineffective to cure a procedural default).
197. This issue, not discussed here, is addressed in part one of this article. See
Clarke (pt. 1), supra note 129, at 1356.
198. 897 F.2d. 709 (4th Cir. 1990).
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error, regardless of the importance of the constitutional value,
or how clear the error, are insufficient. Murray v. Carrier, while
rejecting petitioner's claimed innocence, provided the new for-
mulation of "miscarriage of justice": "where a constitutional
violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is
actually innocent, a federal habeas court may grant the writ
even in the absence of a showing of cause for the procedural
default." 9
This innocence exception occurs in the noncapital setting
when "the State has convicted the wrong person"200 where "it
is evident the law has made a mistake."2' The Court ac-
knowledged that the concept of actual, as distinct from legal,
innocence "does not translate easily into the context of an al-
leged error at the sentencing phase of trial on a capital of-
fense."0 2
Sawyer v. Whitley 3  involved successive and abusive
claims,2 but the Court indicated that its analysis applied to
procedurally defaulted claims as well.20 5 The Court rejected
petitioner's contention that innocence of the death penalty0 6
could be established by a showing "of additional mitigating evi-
dence which was prevented from being introduced as a result of
claimed constitutional error."20 7 Establishment of innocence of
the death penalty requires a petitioner to "show by clear and
convincing evidence that but for a constitutional error, no rea-
sonable juror would have found him eligible for the death pen-
alty under the applicable state law."0 8
This is a very difficult standard to meet. First, the "no rea-
sonable juror" formulation will be nearly impossible to meet
199. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986).
200. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 340 (1992).
201. Id- at 340-41.
202. Id. at 340 (quoting Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 524, 537 (1986)).
203. 505 U.S. 333 (1992).
204. The issue of successive and abusive claims is discussed more fully in Clarke
(pt. 1), supra note 129, at 1356.
205. Sawyer, 505 U.S. at 338.
206. In Sawyer v. Whitley, the Court uses the phrase "actual innocence" and "inno-
cent of the death penalty" throughout. See, e.g., id. at 540.
207. Id. at 346.
208. Id. at 336.
3391996]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 30:303
except in those rare cases where the constitutional error results
in excluding all credible evidence on the point. If any credible
evidence remains, however weak, supporting the point in ques-
tion, then a hypothetical reasonable juror could find it disposi-
tive. Second, Sawyer requires a showing that, but for the con-
stitutional error, petitioner would not have been eligible for
death."9 This limits a death row petitioner to attempting to
prove the absence of aggravating circumstances 21-- that is, the
absence of factors at the sentencing phase that made petitioner
eligible for death. The failure to adduce mitigating evidence at
trial, however compelling, and under whatever circumstances,
will fail to excuse a default. This "miscarriage of justice" excep-
tion is so narrowly constructed that few claims can meet the
test.
211
209. Id. at 346.
210. The point here is innocence of the death penalty. Thus, "innocence" in the
ordinary sense of "innocence of the underlying crime" is ignored.
211. Justice Blackmun, writing separately, said:
I believe that the Court today adopts an unduly cramped view of "actual
innocence." I write separately not to discuss the specifics of the Court's
standard, but instead to reemphasize my opposition to an implicit prem-
ise underlying the Court's decision: that the only "fundamental miscar-
riage of justice" in a capital proceeding that warrants redress is one
where the petitioner can make our a claim of "actual innocence."
505 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun continued: "[T]he
Court's focus on factual innocence is inconsistent with Congress' grant of habeas cor-
pus jurisdiction, pursuant to which federal courts are instructed to entertain petitions
from state prisoners who allege that they are held 'in custody in violation of the
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.' Id. at 355. Justice Blackmun
entertains a broader conception of the "miscarriage of justice" exception that would
allow redress in many more cases than allowed by the majority's test. Even where a
petitioner can make a colorable claim of innocence, the majority's standard will be
difficult to meet. See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993) (rejecting claim of
innocence in a different context from Sawyer, where the petitioner's only constitution-
al claim was that it would violate the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual
punishment to execute an innocent person). While the context in Herrera was quite
different, it does indicate the difficulty of petitioner's burden.
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c. The Objective Factors External to the Defense as Cause for
a Procedural Default
i. Interference By State Officials
Criminal defense lawyers rarely learn about state officials'
misconduct, even where it directly affects criminal proceedings.
When discovered, it can sometimes cure a procedural default.
Amadeo v. Zant"' produced a rarity for death penalty cas-
es-a unanimous Supreme Court. After Tony Amadeo had been
tried and sentenced to death, an unrelated civil action disclosed
a handwritten memorandum establishing a policy causing sys-
tematic underrepresentation of minorities and women in the
jury pool. When the challenge was raised for the first time on
direct appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court ruled that it "comes
to late."213 The Supreme Court found that the discrimination
claim was unavailable at trial, and therefore, the default was
excused.214 The district court's factual determinations were
critical. The memorandum was not "intended for public con-
sumption," "' and was not "readily discoverable"216 but rather
had been "concealed by county officials."21 Default apparently
will be excused where the petitioner is prevented from develop-
ing a meritorious claim by the deliberate interference of state
officials.
The result is different where official intent to interfere is less
clear and where the petitioner had some way of knowing about
the suppression of evidence by officials. Warren McCleskey1 s
had a similar claim to that of Amadeo, this time in the abuse
of the writ context.2  McCleskey had what appeared to be a
212. 486 U.S. 214 (1988).
213. Id. at 218 (quoting Amadeo v. State, 255 S.E.2d 718, 720 (Ga.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 974 (1979)).
214. Id. at 224.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 220.
218. McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
219. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992), equated abuse of the writ, successive
petitions and procedural default in that they all are subject to the same cause and
prejudice standard. Thus, it is reasonable to use abuse of the writ cases in analyzing
procedural default even thought the two concepts are different. See id. at 338.
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meritorious Massiah2 0 claim which was not discovered until
his second (hence abusive) federal habeas corpus proceeding.
The McClesky Court distinguished Amadeo:
This case differs from Amadeo in two crucial respects. First,
there is no finding that the State concealed evidence. And
second, even if the State intentionally concealed the 21-page
document, the concealment would not establish cause here
because, in light of McCleskey's knowledge of the informa-
tion in the document, any initial concealment would not
have prevented him from raising the claim in the first fed-
eral petition."1
Here "state officials deliberately had elicited inculpatory admis-
sions... in violation of his Sixth Amendment rights and had
withheld information he needed to present his claim for re-
lief."222 Where there is no finding that state officials deliber-
ately withheld information, and petitioner had some knowledge
of the facts, cause for avoiding a procedural default is not es-
tablished. Amadeo has been so narrowly limited that few cases
could meet this standard. So long as state officials are clever
enough not to leave written evidence proving misconduct, it is
difficult to see how a claim under this exception could succeed.
ii. Novelty of the Claim
Engle v Issac2' hinted that the novelty of a claim could ex-
cuse the failure to properly raise and preserve it. Reed v.
RossM recognized this exception by holding "that where a
220. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (invalidating admission of in-
criminating statements made to a confederate who was acting in direct concert with
state officials).
221. 499 U.S. 467, 502 (1991).
222. Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. at 359 (Blackmun, J., concurring while comment-
ing on the McCleskey case: "That the Court permitted McCleskey to be executed
without ever hearing the merits of his claims starkly reveals the Court's skewed
value system, in which finality of judgments, conservation of state resources, and
expediency of executions seem to receive greater solicitude than justice and human
life." (citations omitted)).
223. 456 U.S. 107 (1982). The petitioner in Engle had attempted to excuse his
default by asserting the novelty of the claim. The Court responded: "Where the basis
of a constitutional claim is available, and other defense counsel have perceived and
litigated that claim, the demands of comity and finality counsel against labelling
alleged unawareness of the objection as cause for a procedural default." Id. at 134.
224. 468 U.S. 1 (1984).
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constitutional claim is so novel that its legal basis is not rea-
sonably available to counsel, a defendant has cause for his
failure to raise the claim in accordance with applicable state
procedures."2"
A novel claim will also be a new rule for retroactivity analy-
sis under Teague v. Lane."6 This renders new constitutional
rules unavailable to habeas petitioners whose cases were final
when the new rule was announced. The only novel claims that
can now escape Teague's nonretroactivity bar in order to excuse
a procedural default are: (1) those new rules that are estab-
lished prior to petitioner's case becoming final; or, (2) claims
that fall within one of Teague's two narrow exceptions allowing
retroactive application where: (a) the new rule places conduct
"beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to
proscribe"227 or, (b) where the new rule adopts a watershed
rule of criminal procedure that is "central to an accurate de-
termination of innocence or guilt."' It is unlikely that there
will be many, if any, cases that can qualify under this stringent
standard.
d. The Legitimacy of the State's Procedural-Default Rule
A state's procedural bar must be consistently or regularly
applied by the state. If not so applied, it will not constitute an
adequate and independent ground for affirming petitioner's
conviction, and the federal habeas court will be able to address
the merits of the constitutional claim.2" In Johnson v. Missis-
sippi"° the State inconsistently applied its procedural- default
rule to post-conviction requests for relief where the defendant
had received an enhanced penalty because of a prior conviction
that had later been vacated on appeal. Earlier, in Phillips v.
State, 1 the Mississippi Supreme Court had "held that the re-
225. Id. at 16.
226. 489 U.S. 288 (1989); see also supra section IV for an explanation of the
nonretroactivity rule.
227. Teague, 489 U.S. at 307 (citation omitted).
228. Id. at 313.
229. Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 589 (1988); Ulster County Court v. Al-
len, 442 U.S. 140, 152 (1979).
230. 486 U.S. 578 (1988).
231. 421 So. 2d 476 (Miss. 1982).
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versal of a Kentucky conviction that had provided the basis for
an enhanced sentence pursuant to Mississippi's habitual crimi-
nal statute justified postconviction relief."2 32 Johnson had been
sentenced to death based in part upon a prior New York felony
conviction that had been vacated after his case became final.
Mississippi denied relief on collateral review, and the Supreme
Court, noting the inconsistency, reversed.
A state cannot create a procedural rule after defendant's trial
and then apply it retroactively to create a procedural de-
fault.233 But a state court's mandatory time limit for the filing
of a notice of appeal, enforced by barring late appeals, will be
honored by a federal habeas court even though the state court
periodically grants extensions or other special dispensations.2"
Thus, Virginia's periodic grant of leave to file a late appeal in
noncapital cases will not prevent its rigid enforcement of time
limits in capital habeas corpus cases.3 5
B. Part Two: Injustice and the Death Penalty
Executions-the deliberate extinction of human life as pun-
ishment for wrongdoing-cannot be compared with other penal-
ties. Ideally the death penalty is reserved for the few most
heinous murderers. Under our constitution "the determination
of whether a human life should be taken or spared . .. must be
suitably directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of
wholly arbitrary and capricious action."235 Yet in practice, dra-
232. Johnson, 486 U.S. at 586.
233. Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411 (1991).
234. Wise v. Williams, 982 F.2d. 142 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2940
(1993).
235. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (upholding Virginia's enforcement
of a procedural default stemming from a late appeal in a capital habeas corpus case).
Roger Coleman's appeal was filed three days after the mandatory thirty-day time lim-
it; the author successfully procured leave to appeal a first degree murder conviction
resulting in a life sentence over four years after the expiration of the filing date.
Cole v. Commonwealth, No. 920528 (Va. Sup. Ct. Mar. 18, 1991). The author was
advised by the Attorney General's office that these extensions were routine in
noncapital cases where a habeas corpus petition claims that petitioner was denied the
right to appeal. The only difference between the two cases besides the imposition of
the death penalty in Coleman, was that the Coleman default occurred in the state
habeas appeal whereas the Cole default forgiven by the court occurred on direct ap-
peal.
236. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976).
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conian procedural-default rules reward the states "for providing
inadequate counsel,"23 ' and create a new level of arbitrariness
that is wholly unrelated to moral culpability. Underpaid,3 '
inexperienced,' 9  overworked,2" and uncaring, 41 court-ap-
pointed lawyers who fail to understand and raise meritorious
constitutional claims simply grease the skids to death row. The
moral deserts of the defendant have little relationship to the
punishment where the lawyering is incompetent. The present
procedural-default rules lead to unjust and arbitrary results.
Similarly situated capital defendants are treated differently and
disproportionately-depending on the luck of the draw of court-
appointed counsel. Procedural-default rules create a death pen-
alty jurisprudence that imposes death "not for committing the
237. See Stephen B. Bright, Death By Lottery-Procedural Bar of Constitutional
Claims In Capital Cases Due To Inadequate Representation of Indigent Defendants, 92
W. VA. L. REV. 679 (1990).
The state obtains two benefits from the poor representation the defendant
receives: the likelihood of obtaining the death sentence is increased and
any constitutional deficiencies that occur in the process may be insulated
from review. Ironically, the result of Sykes and Strickland is that, so
long as counsel is not so bad as to fall below the Strickland standard,
the poorest
level of representation at trial receives the least scrutiny in post-convic-
tion review.
Id. at 691-92 (citations omitted).
238. See Marcia Cole et al., Fatal Defense: Trial and Error in the Nation's Death
Belt, 12 THE NAVL L.J. 32 (June 11, 1990). The article discloses that, in capital cas-
es, court-appointed defense lawyers receive: (1) Alabama-$40/hr. in-court, $20/hr. out-
of-court; (2) Georgia-generally $30/hr. in-court, $20/hr. out-of court; (3) Mississip-
pi-average $11.75/hr., maximum $1000; (4) California-$40-$100/hr; (5) Ohio-$50hr
in-court, $40/hr. out-of-court. Id.
239. See id. at 40. Only 42.4% of lawyers surveyed wlo had been appointed to a
capital case practiced criminal law 80% or more of the time. Most had never handled
a capital case prior to assignment. Approximately one-third lacked co-counsel on the
case. Id.
240. See id. (quoting an Alabama court appointed attorney: "Most attorneys taking
these cases are sole practitioners who've got to pay the light bill and don't have time
to keep up with all the federal cases." Another from Mississippi said: "Its a tradition
in the rural South to give the cases to younger lawyers who couldn't make a living
doing criminal work in these towns." Id.
241. See Esther F. Lardent & Douglas M. Cohen, The Last Best Hope: Representing
Death Row Inmates, 23 Loy. LJ.A L. REV. 213, 214 (1989) (citing Lane, Pro Bono and
Death Row, 19 A.L.I., A.B.A., CLE REV., at 4-5 (Dec. 23, 1986). "In one case the for-
mer Imperial Wizard of the local Klan represented a black defendant charged with
raping and murdering a white woman, referred to his client as 'a nigger boy' in con-
versations, fell asleep during meetings with the [district attorney], and interposed
both an insanity defense and a general denial defense simultaneously." Id.
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worst crime, but for being assigned the worst lawyer."2 42 A
few examples suffice to illustrate the relationship between poor
lawyering, procedural-default rules, and capricious imposition of
the death penalty.
1. Smith v. Murray'
Michael Marnell Smith received a death sentence based on
constitutionally inadmissible psychiatric testimony.' Smith's
lawyer requested a court-appointed psychiatric examination.
Defense counsel was aware that under Virginia law at the time
the psychiatric record would be forwarded to the prosecution
and would be admissible evidence.' Counsel failed to specifi-
cally advise Smith not to discuss prior crimes with the psychia-
trist. At trial the prosecution called as its witness the same
defense-requested psychiatrist so as to prove future dangerous-
ness as an aggravating circumstance. That psychiatrist testified
over the defense's objection that Smith was a "sociopathic per-
sonality" who had admitted in the psychiatric interview to hav-
ing attempted to rape a young girl.2" One can hardly imagine
more damaging testimony on the issue of future dangerousness;
the jury found that Smith was likely to be dangerous in the
future and imposed the death penalty. Although defense coun-
sel had objected to the introduction of this psychiatric testimony
at trial, he failed to include the claim in the assignments of
242. Bright, supra note 237, at 695.
243. 477 U.S. 527 (1986).
244. See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981) (psychiatric testimony based upon
prior examination of the defendant is inadmissible unless defendant has validly
waived Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights prior to the examination). This rule has
been held to be retroactive. See Jones v. McCotter, 767 F.2d. 101 (5th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 947 (1986); Muniz v. Procunier, 760 F.2d. 588 (5th Cir. 1985).
245. See Gibson v. Commonwealth, 219 S.E.2d 845, 847 (Va. 1975), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 994 (1976).
246. Smith, 477 U.S. at 529.
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error on appeal,' thus defaulting the issue. In deciding to
omit this issue on appeal,' defense counsel relied on an aber-
rant Virginia Supreme Court precedent24 9 that was subsequently
invalidated by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals" while
Smith's direct appeal was still pending. The majority refused
relief on habeas corpus because Smith had failed to excuse the
procedural default. The dissent pointed out that this death sen-
tence survived "despite serious Fifth and Eighth Amendment
violations that played a critical role in the determination that
death [was the] appropriate penalty.""5 Counsel for a party
amicus curiae before the Virginia Supreme Court, Richard Bon-
nie," (who had attempted unsuccessfully to raise the issue)
points out the capricious series of errors and fortuitous circum-
stances that led to Smith's death sentence and the unsuccessful
attacks thereon:
247. Smith v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 135, 139 n.1 (Va. 1978) (arguments
raised at trial but not comprehended by the petitioner's assignments of error "will not
be noticed by this Court" despite fact that the issues had been briefed by a party
amicus curiae).
248. In its opinion, the court noted:
Here the record unambiguously reveals that petitioner's counsel objected
to the admission of Dr. Pile's testimony at trial and then consciously
elected not to pursue that claim before the Supreme Court of Virginia.
The basis for that decision was counsel's perception that the claim had
little chance of success in the Virginia courts. With the benefit of hind-
sight, petitioner's counsel in this Court now contends that this perception
proved to be incorrect.
Smith, 477 U.S. at 534 (citations omitted). The court continued: "Nor can it seriously
be maintained that the decision not to press the claim on appeal was an error of
such magnitude that it rendered counsel's performance constitutionally deficient under
the test of StricIdand v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)." Smith, 477 U.S. at 535.
249. See Gibson v. Commonwealth, 219 S.E.2d 845 (Va. 1975).
250. Gibson v. Zahradnick, 581 F.2d 75 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 996
(1978).
251. 477 U.S. at 540 (Stevens, J. dissenting, joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and
Brennan J.J.) The majority does not take issue with this characterization of the case.
Later, Justice Stevens states that it is "absolutely clear that the introduction of this
evidence .. .violated the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 551.
252. Richard J. Bonnie acted as counsel amicus curiae for the Post-Conviction
Assistance Project of the University of Virginia Law School. Professor Bonnie's integri-
ty is demonstrated by his confession of error in failing to seek to persuade trial coun-
sel to amend the assignments of error to include this issue. Professor Bonnie also
acted as Smith's co-counsel in the federal habeas proceedings.
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It is clear that the psychiatrist's testimony was constitu-
tionally inadmissible and that, if the claim had not been
defaulted, Smith's death sentence would have been set
aside. Yet, notwithstanding nine years of post-conviction
litigation, the claim was never reviewed on its merits by
any court. Smith was executed under a constitutionally
defective death sentence because the Virginia Supreme
Court chose to ignore the error even though it was raised in
an amicus brief. The perversity of the outcome in Michael
Smith's case is amply demonstrated by noting the cumu-
lative series of omissions that sealed his fate:
Michael Smith's death sentence would have been set
aside if the second-year law student who assisted in the
appeal had researched federal law or had realized that
Gibson v. Commonwealth was an aberrant decision.
Michael Smith's death sentence would have been set
aside if his lawyer had been aware of the federal dimension
of the claim or had assigned the error anyway, simply to
preserve the issue for federal review.
Michael Smith's death sentence would have been set
aside if the attorney who filed the amicus brief in the Vir-
ginia Supreme Court, and who was aware of the federal
law, had simply picked up the phone to suggest that
Smith's lawyer amend his assignment of error. I [Richard
Bonnie] was that amicus attorney.
Michael Smith's death sentence would have been set
aside if his lawyer had read the amicus brief, had realized
that the claim should have been preserved, had tried to
amend the assignments of error, and had been permitted to
do so.
Michael Smith's death sentence would have been set
aside if the Virginia Supreme Court had taken note of the
alleged error, sua sponte, as many state courts would have
done."
Errors and fortuitous circumstances led to Michael Marnell
Smith's execution."M In Estelle v. Smith,2 55 Ernest Smith had
precisely the same claim. His lawyers raised and preserved the
253. Richard J. Bonnie, Preserving Justice In Capital Cases While Streamlining the
Process of Collateral Review, 23 U. TOL. L. REv. 99, 111 (1991).
254. Michael Smith was executed on July 31, 1986. He was the fifth person exe-
cuted in Virginia under the modern post-Furman death penalty statute, and the 62nd
in the United States. Death Row, U.S., supra note 84.
255. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
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issue, and his death sentence was overturned. This is "death by
lottery," 6 and it demonstrates that a lawyer's error in proce-
durally defaulting a meritorious claim often means death in
capital case litigation. Can a system be just that turns directly
on attorney omissions rather than the merits of the case or the
moral culpability of the perpetrator?
2. Dugger v. Adams
27
It can be argued that the error in Smith v. Murray did not
undermine the trial's truth-finding function; on the contrary,
one might argue that the psychiatric testimony, although clear-
ly inadmissible, enhanced the trial's reliability insofar as it
placed relevant evidence of past violent behavior before the jury
on the issue of future dangerousness. One might attempt to
justify the rigid enforcement of the procedural default in Smith
v. Murray on the basis that the error, though serious, did not
corrupt the accuracy of the proceedings. This argument deval-
ues constitutional commandments long thought to be essential
to a fair trial. It places constitutional values in a peculiar hier-
archy that values the result over all other values. Even assum-
ing that this glorification of guilt or innocence over other values
in the Constitution has merit, this argument fails to address
the injustice in Dugger v. Adams.
The trial judge in Aubrey Dennis Adams, Jr's. capital trial
instructed prospective jurors that their role was merely adviso-
ry, and regarding sentencing, that "[t]he ultimate responsibility
for what this man gets is not on your shoulders. It's on my
shoulders."' Counsel failed to object to this instruction, de-
spite having a state law basis for such an objection.259
While Adams' case was being collaterally reviewed, the Su-
preme Court in Caldwell v. Mississippi"'0 held that it was a
violation of the Eighth Amendment to mislead the jury into
believing that the responsibility for determining the appropri-
256. Bright, supra note 237 (coining the phrase "death by lottery" to illustrate the
capriciousness of the death penalty).
257. 489 U.S. 401 (1989).
258. Id. at 403.
259. Id. at 408.
260. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
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ateness of a death sentence rests elsewhere. Because Adams'
lawyer had failed to raise this issue, it was procedurally de-
faulted, and he was not entitled to relief.
Justice Blackmun, dissenting in Dugger v. Adams, pointed
out the pervasiveness of the trial judges error by saying that
"the Judge drummed this misinformation into the jurors' heads
by repeatedly telling them that 'the most important thing...
to remember' was the nonbinding nature of their recommenda-
tion and that the capital sentencing decision was not on their
'conscience' but on his."26' The dissent then connected the per-
vasiveness of this error directly to the accuracy function of a
capital sentencing proceeding:
The alleged error in this case was severe: the incorrect
instructions may well have caused the jury to vote for a
death sentence that it would not have returned had it been
accurately instructed....
Thus, it is plain that respondent has presented a "substan-
tial claim that the alleged error undermined the accuracy of
the ... sentencing determination" at his trial. Indeed, the
very essence of a Caldwell claim is that the accuracy of the
sentencing determination has been unconstitutionally under-
mined....
The alleged error thus is global in scope: it necessarily
pervades the entire sentencing process. Indeed, the alleged
error in this case, if true, could not help but pervert the
sentencing decision.6 2
The procedural default in Dugger v. Adams led directly to
error that went to the heart of capital-sentence decision-mak-
ing. Caldwell's lawyer raised the issue and procured relief;
Adams' lawyer missed the point and his client was executed
despite a flawed sentencing proceeding, the accuracy of which is
open to serious question. Furthermore, the Supreme Court's
result orientation and desire to speed executions along even in
261. Dugger, 489 U.S. at 422 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
262. Id. at 422-23 (citations omitted).
263. Aubrey Adams was executed by the State of Texas on May 4, 1989. He was
the 108th person executed in the United States under the modern post-Furman death
penalty statute. Death Row, U.S.A., supra note 84.
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the face of unreliable decision-making is evident in the Court's
rationale. The majority reasoned that an unreliable death sen-
tence could not result in a miscarriage of justice because, if it
did, it "would turn the case in which an error results in a fun-
damental miscarriage of justice, the 'extraordinary case,' into an
all too ordinary one."2 Kathleen Patchel observes that this
is a blatant exercise in instrumentalism. The existence of
an unacceptable level of unreliability in the sentencing
decision when a Caldwell violation has occurred does not
result in a miscarriage of justice because, if the Court held
that it did, that would allow federal habeas courts to hear
too many defaulted claims."
Can such a rationale be just? Professor Patchel asks "how
can any case be ordinary when it involves an unacceptable level
of unreliability as to the decision to execute a human be-
ing."26
3. Other Examples of Procedural Perversity
John Eldon Smith, aka Tony Machetti, and Rebecca Adkins
Smith Machetti were sentenced to death by juries that were
systematically, and unconstitutionally underrepresented by
women.267 Rebecca's lawyers raised the claim and procured re-
lief-she now serves a life sentence. Smith's lawyers procedurally
defaulted the issue and he was executed. If anything, John
Eldon Smith was the least culpable of the three who committed
the murders that landed him on death row.268 Capability of
counsel rather than culpability of the defendants dictated the
outcome. The doctrine of procedural default operates like a
game of chance rather than a rule of justice.
264. Dugger, 489 U.S. at 412 n.6 (citation omitted).
265. Kathleen Patchel, The New Habeas, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 939, 976 (1991).
266. Id. at 976 n.226.
267. The cases of John Eldon Smith, aka Tony Machetti, and Rebecca Adkinns
Smith Machetti are set out in Clarke (pt. 1), supra note 129, at 1356.
268. The third person, John Maree, struck a deal with the government and re-
ceived a life sentence. See Clarke (pt. 1), supra note 129, at 1356.
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Warren McCleskey, it will be recalled," 9 was executed de-
spite an apparently meritorious Fifth Amendment Massiah270
claim that was never heard on the merits. Again the cause and
prejudice standard erected an impenetrable barrier to a hearing
on this constitutional error. The perversity of McCleskey's case
is exacerbated by the fact that the state withheld evidence
necessary for the construction of the claim. McCleskey could not
prove deliberate official misconduct in the withholding of the
evidence; absent proof that the state officials engaged in inten-
tional misconduct the penalty for the failure to timely assert
the claim was placed on McCleskey. That the circumstances
surrounding the state's withholding of documents might appear
suspiciously intentional is legally irrelevant-such was not
proved-so the fault was McCleskey's.
4. The Problem of Innocence
Some might argue that while all of these examples involved
important claims of constitutional error, none involved true
claims of innocence; that is, none involved a claim that the
wrong person was convicted. This argument ignores the sheer
capriciousness of our capital punishment system and it devalues
all constitutional claims that do not directly impugn the accura-
cy functions of a trial result. Nonetheless, this argument has
popular appeal and cannot be summarily dismissed. Those who
see innocence as the only value worth constitutional protection
must be particularly troubled by the conviction and execution of
innocent persons.
Procedural default, and its closely related concept, ineffective
assistance of counsel, combine to make it much less likely that
the wholly innocent, and those who are "innocent of the death
penalty," will receive a hearing, much less an effective hearing.
The narrowly constrained criteria for establishing innocence by
269. See supra section V.A.6.c.i.
270. In Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) the police bugged a car in
which the defendant had a conversation with a former confederate who was secretly
working undercover for the police. The Court held that this violated defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel.
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clear and convincing evidence.7' insures that few substantial
claims of innocence can be vindicated by the courts. That, in
turn, insures that, human institutions being what they are,
more, rather than less, innocent people will be executed. A part
of the safety net designed to reduce error has been eroded.
Earl Washington's death sentence from Virginia for rape and
murder provides a case on point.2 Evidence from specimens
from the crime scene were subjected to DNA testing long after
Washington's conviction had become final. These tests excluded
Washington as the secretor. He could not have raped the victim
who, before she died, had said that there was only one assail-
ant. The wrong person was convicted, and would have been
executed but for a gubernatorial pardon commuting the sen-
tence to life imprisonment. Washington, who is probably inno-
cent, continues to serve out a life sentence. Because the evi-
dence comes too late, and is thus defaulted,7 he lacks an
effective legal mechanism and cannot be released under Virgin-
ia law.
While holding an innocent person in prison can be criti-
cized, 4 had there been a less sympathetic and courageous
governor, he might well have been executed despite his proba-
271. The innocence standard of Sawyer v. Whitley, 112 S. Ct. 2514 (1993) is dis-
cussed in supra section V.A.6.b.
272. Washington v. Commonwealth, 323 S.E.2d 577 (Va. 1984), cert. denied, 471
U.S. 1111 (1985).
273. Rule 1:1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia provides that final
judgments remain under the trial court's jurisdiction for only 21 days and may be
modified, vacated, or suspended only during that narrow period. Once the trial court
loses jurisdiction, it cannot enter any further orders. See, e.g., LEIGH B. MIDDLEDITCH,
JR., & KENT SINCLAIR, VIRGINIA CIVIL PROCEDURE § 10.2 at 430 (2d ed. 1992). In a
criminal case even after- discovered evidence of perjury by a government witness is
not ordinarily sufficient to secure habeas relief. Fitzgerald v. Bass, 366 S.E. 615 (Va.
App. 1988). In the criminal context, the interplay between Hawks v. Cox, 175 S.E.2d
271 (Va. 1970) which bars relitigation of issues that were raised in the trial court,
and Slayton v. Parrigon, 205 S.E.2d 680 (Va. 1974) which precludes raising issues on
habeas that were not raised (that is, were defaulted) in the trial court, has limited
Virginia habeas corpus to jurisdictional issues and to claims of ineffective assistance
of counsel. Walker v. Mitchell, 299 S.E.2d 698 (Va. 1983). These rules apply to death
penalty cases. See, e.g., Correll v. Commonwealth, 352 S.E. 2d 352 (Va. 1987). As a
result, there is no effective legal mechanism to address Washington's claim of inno-
cence under Virginia law.
274. Eric M. Freedman, In Virginia, Innocent Man Stays in Prison, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 28, 1994, at A26.
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ble innocence. Governor Wilder of Virginia, the nation's first
Black American governor, commuted three death sentences
during his four year term of office; the prior two governors did
not grant a single commutation."5 Each person receiving a
commutation, Joe Giarratanno, Herbert Bassett, and Earl
Washington, had substantial claims of innocence-that their
convictions were wrongful; each came close to execution without
any relief from any court; each serves a life sentence because
one governor had the courage to do an otherwise politically
unpopular thing by commuting their death penalties."6 The
decline of executive clemency nationwide has been well docu-
mented.277 As both the courts and governors reduce effective
avenues for relief, the likelihood of executing the innocent in-
creases.
Shabaka Sundiata Waglini of Florida,27 Walter McMillian
of Alabama,279 and Randall Adams of Texas,"0 were all on
death row; all were later proved to have been totally innocent.
Although it is not possible to know the precise number of inno-
cent persons who have been executed, scholars believe that the
275. John F. Harris, Death Penalty Case Thrusts Virginia Into Center of Debate
Again, THE WASH. POST, May 15, 1992, at D1.
276. Id.
277. See Hugo Adam Bedau, The Decline of Executive Clemency in Capital Cases,
18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 255 (1990-91).
278. Symposium, Politics and the Death Penalty: Can Rational Discourse and Due
Process Survive the Political Pressure? 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 239, 247 (1994) (re-
marks by Shabaka Sundiata Waglini, a former death row inmate).
279. Id. 253 (remarks by Brian Stevenson, Walter McMillian's habeas lawyer).
280. That Randall Adams survived death row at all was entirely fortuitous. His
original death sentence was reversed because of constitutional error in the selection of
the jury. Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38 (1980). The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
then ordered a new trial, but in the interim the Governor commuted Adams' sentence
to life imprisonment. Adams ultimately sought and received a writ of habeas corpus
from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granting a new trial. Among other things,
that court found that the use of perjured testimony at trial could be imputed to the
prosecutor, and that the failure to correct the perjured testimony, the failure to dis-
close a misidentification, and improper coaching of a witness violated Adams' right to
a fair trial. Ex Parte Adams, 768 S.W.2d 281, 293-94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). Adams
was ultimately exonerated. Zolton Ferency, Adams v. Texas, 36 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
719-726 (1991) (reviewing RANDALL D. ADAMS, ET AL., ADAMS V. TExAS (1991)). Had
the United States Supreme Court not given him time by its initial reversal on
grounds wholly unrelated to his innocence claim, the evidence of his innocence might
never have materialized. Indeed, it seems almost a miracle that the prosecutorial and
police misconduct that put Randall Adams on death row was ever uncovered. How
many more innocent Randall Adams are on death row?
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risk of erroneous executions are much higher than has been
commonly supposed. 8' Rigid procedural-default rules and min-
imal requirements for the effective assistance of counsel com-
bine to increase that risk. Reliance on executive clemency, given
present day political realities, is unrealistic. In a number of
states in the deep South, governors regularly run election cam-
paigns on a get-tough-on-crime braggadocio that centers on how
many execution orders that the candidate has signed.282 In
Alabama a gubernatorial candidate made a pledge to "fry them
'till their eyes pop out."2" Should our nation's federal courts
be abdicating their responsibilities in this political climate?
Should life itself hang on the mercy of a state elected official
who would "fry them 'till' their eyes pop out"?
I take issue with those who see innocence as the sole consti-
tutional virtue. In order for the values contained within our Bill
of Rights to have meaning, there must be effective and practical
ways to assert those rights. States have little incentive to en-
force constitutional commands when the only oversight of their
actions comes with rarely exercised certiorari review in the
Supreme Court. Circumscribing habeas corpus reduces access to
rights-rights that are a part of our notions of fundamental
fairness. Those who remain of a different view-those who exalt
innocence over all other types of claims-however, are unlikely
.to be swayed by these concerns. All must, however, be pro-
foundly troubled at how often our modern due process capital
punishment system gets it wrong. Rigid enforcement of proce-
dural default in the capital punishment arena increases the
opportunity for error, thus contributing to the arbitrariness and
capriciousness of the system. It assumes that indigent capital
defendants all have access to good lawyers who timely make
the correct claims. Nothing could be more wrong. So long as the
281. Hugo A. Bedau & Michael L. Radelet, Miscarriages of Justice in Potentially
Capital Cases, 40 STAN. L. REv. 21 (1987).
282. Symposium, supra note 278, at 246 (comments of Professor James Coleman);
see also, Richard Cohen, Playing Politics With the Death Penalty, THE WASH. POST,
Mar. 20, 1990, at A19 ("In Texas, everyone in the gubernatorial race favors the death
penalty. Former governor, Mark White ran an ad in which he walked along a panel
of huge photos of men executed during his term as governor. 'I made sure they re-
ceived the ultimate penalty: death.').
283. Symposium, supra note 278, at 254 (comments of Bryan Stevenson).
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quality of justice received by capital defendants turns on the
sheer chance of who gets the worst state appointed lawyer in a
system designed to attract the least successful, and least capa-
ble, lawyers, rigid enforcement of procedural default will contin-
ue to produce unjust results.
5. The Perversion of Habeas Corpus
Stringent federal procedural-default rules encourage strict
state enforcement of preclusion rules. State courts can avoid
federal habeas oversight of criminal convictions simply by ap-
plying a state procedural-default rule and then refusing to ad-
dress the merits of the claim. They can insure that there will
be many defaults of meritorious constitutional issues by ap-
pointing the least knowledgeable and least effective lawyers. As
a result of stringent federal enforcement of state procedural
defaults following Wainwright v. Sykes, both Georgia and Mis-
sissippi have adopted stringent state default rules:
The true motivation for stricter state procedural bars is
often a desire to preclude the federal courts from reviewing
(and their more likely upholding) meritorious constitutional
claims. The state of Mississippi expressly articulated this
motivation in urging the Mississippi Supreme Court to bar
all claims that were not timely raised at trial and on direct
appeal. The state said it was advocating this "not because
such would promote the interests of justice, but rather [be-
cause] such would pull the rug out from under [the petition-
er] when he ultimately seeks federal review of his case.'
Stringent federal procedural-default rules encourage stricter
state enforcement of state procedural-preclusion rules, that in
turn reduces the probability that a serious claim will be heard
on the merits by any court at any level. This in turn allows
death penalty proponents to play a public shell game. At the
cusp of an impending execution, they can and do comment
publicly on the numbers of courts that have reviewed a con-
284. Ronald J. Tabak & J. Mark Lane, Judicial Activism and Legislative "Reform"
of Federal Habeas Corpus: A Critical Analysis of Recent Developments And Current
Proposals, 55 ALB. L. REV. 1, 42 (1991).
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demned person's case and refused relief.2" Yet the public is nev-
er told that few, if any, of the prisoner's claims were ever heard
by any court on the merits." The public is given the impres-
sion that great lengths are gone to insure that justice is done,
when in fact courts at every level repeatedly dodge the merits
of the claims. The complexity of these issues make it nearly
285. An example of this can be found in Republican State Representative Dalton
Smith's editorial: Gary Graham Has Been Treated Fairly, But People of Texas Haven't
Been, THE Hous. CHRON., May 1, 1994, at 4, where the author lists all of the many
court proceedings that reviewed and denied Graham's death sentence without pointing
out that his innocence claim had not been heard by any court on the merits, nor
would any court have heard that claim had not the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
intervened. Also, Gary Graham's claim that the Texas jury that sentenced him was
unable to consider his youth and relatively good background was never heard on the
merits because it constituted a new rule under Teague v. Lane. Graham v. Collins,
113 S. Ct. 892 reh'g denied, 113 S. Ct. 1406 (1993). See, supra section IV for an
exposition of Graham v. Collins.
286. Michael Marnell Smith's case constitutes another example of how courts time
after time refuse to address a death sentenced inmates meritorious but defaulted
claims. The procedural history of his case is instructive:
(1) On direct appeal the Virginia Supreme Court refused to address meritorious
but defaulted Estelle error that was raised by amicus curiae but not raised by trial
counsel. Smith v. Virginia, 248 S.E.2d 135, 139 n.1 (Va. 1978).
(2) The Supreme Court denied certiorari to a petition that again failed to raise
the Estelle issue (one wonders what trial
counsel was thinking by this time since he by now had been apprized of the issue by
amicus counsel). Smith v. Virginia, 441 U.S. 967 (1979).
(3) On state habeas the trial court refused to consider the Estelle error finding
that it had been procedurally defaulted. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 532
(1986).
(4) The Virginia Supreme Court "declined to accept the appeal." Id.
(5) The Supreme Court again denied certiorari. Smith v. Virginia, 454 U.S.
1128 (1981).
(6) The federal habeas court in an unpublished order found that the Estelle
error had been defaulted and refused to address the merits. See Smith v. Murray,
477 U.S. 527, 532 (1986).
(7) The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed on different grounds, appar-
ently believing that because the jury had relied on two aggravating circumstances,
the error as to only one-the future dangerousness predicate-did not suffice to inval-
idate the death penalty. This was as close as petitioner came to a merits determina-
tion of the issue. Id.
(8) The Supreme Court affirmed on the ground that the issue was procedurally
defaulted. Id. at 533.
As Professor Bonnie says, "notwithstanding nine years of post-conviction litiga-
tion, the claim was never reviewed on its merits by any court. Bonnie, supra note
253, at 111. The Supreme Court rendered its decision on June 26, 1986, and Michael
Marnell Smith was executed a month later on July 31. Death Row U.S.A., supra note
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impossible for other voices to be heard or understood in thirty
to sixty second sound bites on the local news.
While this state of affairs may be minimally acceptable in
noncapital cases, it is perverse and unjust under our present
capital punishment system, and it is at war with the purpose of
habeas corpus. Justice Holmes, dissenting in Frank v.
Mangum,"' argued that "habeas corpus cuts through all forms
and goes to the very tissue of the structure. It comes in from
the outside, not in subordination to the proceedings, and al-
though every form may have been preserved opens the inquiry
whether they have been more than an empty shell."2" Eight
years later Holmes' view of habeas corpus became the majority
view in Moore v. Dempsey.289 Rigid procedural-default rules
cast aside the justice done in Moore v. Dempsey, and, together
with the other restrictive procedural rulings of the Rehnquist
Court,"0 return habeas corpus to the injustice of Frank v.
Mangum. Procedural-default rules, like the holding in Frank v.
Mangum (which sanctioned a mob dominated death verdict on
the ground that due process required no more than that the
Georgia Supreme Court review the claim) refuse to address
injustice on the merits. Indeed, they refuse to address injustice
at all; they prefer a mechanical rule designed to avoid having
to look at the justice of a claim. Procedural-default rules choose
finality over fairness. The federal rules sanction hypertechnical
state pleading rules that create traps for the unwary. Procedur-
al default remains the crown jewel of the Supreme Court's
"[b]yzantine morass of arbitrary, unnecessary, and unjustifiable
impediments to the vindication of federal rights... ,91 Ame-
lioration of rigid procedural-default rules in capital cases would
be salutary and just.
287. 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
288. Id. at 346 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
289. 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
290. For other examples of the Rehnquist court's restrictive procedural rules in
federal habeas corpus, see Clark (pt. 1), supra note 129, at 1356 (discussing the ex-
haustion of remedies requirement of federal (habeas corpus); Clarke (pt. 1), supra
note 169, at 1366) (discussing ineffective assistance of counsel); supra section IV
(discussing retroactivity in hasbeas proceedings).
291. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 758 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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C. Part Three: A Comparative Analysis of the Procedural-
Default Rules of Kentucky and Virginia in Death Penalty
Jurisprudence
1. Introduction: Impetus for the Study
The Rehnquist Court's doctrinal basis for promulgating rigid
procedural rules limiting access to federal habeas corpus turns
on the asserted interest that state criminal-justice systems have
in the finality of judgments and the concomitant efficiency of
process fostered thereby. Comity, it is argued, requires federal
habeas courts to avoid unduly trenching on state criminal pro-
ceedings. Retroactivity analysis,292 the doctrine of complete ex-
haustion,29 and strictly enforced procedural default require-
ments, 4 all share the common justification of arguably pro-
moting finality and efficiency of state criminal justice systems.
Professor Bonnie has persuasively shown the inefficiency of
exhaustion requirements in death penalty habeas-corpus litiga-
tion which can have the effect of bouncing cases and issues
back and forth between the federal and state systems.295 The
injustice of overly rigid retroactivity analysis has been com-
mented upon,"' but it is difficult to see how efficiency or fi-
nality issues could be successfully analyzed in this area until
retroactivity jurisprudence becomes more stable and predictable.
Procedural default, on the other hand, now constitutes a
relatively stable body of law. The extent to which procedural-
292. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309, reh'g denied, 490 U.S. 1031 (1989) (ret-
roactive application of rules "undermines the principle of finality" and is therefore
less efficient).
293. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518-20 (1982) (doctrine of total exhaustion en-
courages petitioners to seek full relief in state courts, "giving those courts the first
opportunity to review all claims," which arguably promotes efficiency by allowing the
state courts to winnow out the less serious claims, and by requiring all claims to be
asserted in one proceeding).
294. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 89-90, reh'g denied 434 U.S. 880 (1977)
(deliberate by-pass rule of Fay v. Noia "may encourage 'sandbagging' on the part of
defense lawyers," thus giving rise to inefficient treatment of state criminal trials as a
"tryout on the road" to federal habeas corpus).
295. Bonnie, supra note 253, at 113-14.
296. See supra section IV.
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default rules contribute to the finality and efficiency values of a
judicial system can be determined and analyzed. The numbers
of cases involving procedural defaults in death penalty cases
can be objectively determined; the types of issues involved can
be analyzed; and, most importantly, jurisdictions with differing
procedural-default rules in capital cases can be compared. This
allows assessment of the impact of differing procedural-default
rules on the efficiency of a state's criminal justice system. It
also allows one to predict the probable effect on efficiency that
a change in the rigidity of a state's procedural-default rules
would have. This, in turn, allows assessment of the "fairness"
versus "efficiency" arguments that dominate the debate in this
part of death-penalty habeas jurisprudence.
Procedural-default rules are particularly good candidates for
this kind of comparative analysis because the procedural rules
in question are peculiarly those of the individual states. In this
area of the law (unlike, for example, retroactivity analysis) the
federal habeas court must determine and then follow the law of
the individual state from which a particular death sentence
emanates. The various death-penalty states have differing rules
that can be effectively compared, with contrasting results noted,
in a context that matters. Life and death can turn on the hap-
penstance of how a particular state utilizes its procedural-de-
fault rules.
Virginia and Kentucky are good states for this type of com-
parison. Both states have death rows that are sufficiently large
for a useful body of death-penalty jurisprudence to have devel-
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oped,"9' yet are small enough to make this project attainable.
These two states stand at opposite poles in their enforcement of
procedural defaults in death-penalty cases. Virginia has been
among the most rigid in its enforcement of procedural-default
rules in capital cases.29 Kentucky, in contrast relaxes enforce-
ment of its contemporaneous objection rule in death penalty
cases. Unlike Virginia, the Kentucky Supreme Court states that
"[wihere the defendant's life is at stake, technical rules of pro-
cedure must give way to the more lofty aim that justice may be
done. , 99
By comparing the way in which procedural-default rules
actually work in post-Furman death-penalty cases in both
states, we can make a reasonably reliable estimate of the fre-
quency with which forgiveness of procedural defaults would
likely cause retrials. From this, subject to the limitations stated
below, we can determine the degree to which procedural-default
rules contribute to efficiency and finality in death-penalty cases.
It is important to determine whether the factual predicates
upon which procedural rules are based are empirically verifi-
able. To the extent that the asserted factual predicates support-
297. According to Death Row U.S.A., supra note 84, Kentucky had 27 on its death
row and Virginia had 48 on its death row. One significant difference is that as of the
summer of 1993 Kentucky had no executions while Virginia had 20. It appears that
Kentucky has been slower to execute, which from a superficial view might appear to
signal inefficiency. However, in light of the few cases found in which a procedurally
defaulted issue resulted in a reversal of a death sentence in Kentucky, that issue is
almost certainly not the cause of this difference. This does account for one difference,
however, that is significant for the purposes of this study. There are relatively few
Kentucky death sentences that have found their way into the federal habeas corpus
system. Thus, we lack a significant body of federal jurisprudence addressing
Kentucky's relaxed procedural-default rules in death sentence cases. Since it is the
state rules, and the state supreme court's treatment of its own procedural rules that
is determinative in both the federal and state systems, this difference should not
make any significant difference-a study of how the two state supreme court's deal
with procedural default is useful regardless of whether federal habeas cases can be
compared. Thus, federal cases will not be extensively addressed by this study, and
will only be used for illustrative purposes. Once a larger body of federal habeas law
develops out of Kentucky, this lacunae can be addressed, and, of course, other states
can be studied for comparison in other studies of this issue.
298. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991); Smith v. Murray, 477
U.S. 527 (1986); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986); see also, Wise v. Williams,
982 F.2d 142 (4th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2940 (1993) (Virginia strictly
and regularly enforces time limit for notice of appeal).
299. Ice v. Commonwealth, 667 S.W.2d 671, 674 (Ky. 1984).
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ing these rules are lacking, it indicates that other unstated
values are the real issues to be confronted. Thus, this study at-
tempts to ascertain the extent to which the stated goals of
finality and efficiency support rigidly enforced procedural-de-
fault rules in death-penalty cases. It does this by comparing
cases from a strict enforcement state-Virginia-with those of a
state with more relaxed procedural-default rules in death pen-
alty cases-Kentucky. This section concludes by finding that
relaxation of strict procedural-default rules would have little, if
any, adverse effect on judicial efficiency. The relatively few
reversals of death-penalty cases that would occur but for issues
that were otherwise procedurally defaulted would cause little, if
any, loss of efficiency. There is even a probable net gain in
judicial efficiency to be had from relaxation of strict procedural-
default rules, given the enormous amount of time and energy
now devoted to litigating the issue of whether or not issues
have been procedurally defaulted. Relaxing procedural-default
rules in death penalty cases will not open the flood-gates, but it
will reduce wrangling over the procedural issues that now con-
sume the courts. This leads one to take a more serious look at
the injustice done when the meritorious claims of a death-sen-
tenced prisoner are not addressed on the merits.
2. Methodology
Attempts were made to locate all post-Furman death sentenc-
es reviewed on appeal °° by the Kentucky and Virginia Su-
preme Courts utilizing traditional library and computer assisted
methods, including both Lexis and Westlaw. Cases thus found
were correlated with other data bases"°' such as the Death
300. Both direct appeals and post-conviction cases were included from both states.
There were only a few of these from each state. This yields a few more cases than
death-sentenced prisoners because those on death row with a reported post-conviction
case will have two reported cases, including the direct appeal. However, any distor-
tion created by this tends to balance out, and in any event the numbers of prisoners
from each state with multiple reported cases was small. Thus, this does not skew the
data, and has the advantage of including all reported cases in which a procedural
default could potentially be found.
301. Since gaps were found in both data bases, it was necessary to run all search
terms through both data bases so that one could act as a check on the other. In
addition, some cases were manually Shepardized, and since each state maintains lists
of death sentences for proportionality purposes these lists were checked to attempt to
362
DEATH PENALTY HABEAS CORPUS
Row U.S.A statistics compiled by the NAACP Legal Defense
and Educational Fund. These cases, already divided by state,
were subdivided into those affirming death sentences and those
reversing death sentences (or the underlying conviction). This
made possible the determination of the further subset of cases
involving reversals stemming from issues that were procedur-
ally defaulted at trial.
Once it was confirmed that Virginia had never looked past a
procedural-default to reverse a death sentence,"0 2 a further
step was taken with respect to Virginia. Using Lexis and
Westlaw, all death-sentence cases that involved invocation of
Rule 5:21 and its successor Rule 5:25 of the Rules of the Su-
preme Court of Virginia were located. These rules bar appellate
notice of error to which no contemporaneous objection was
made."0 ' While it may be possible that the Virginia Supreme
Court has on some occasion noted a defaulted claim without
citing Rule 5:21 or 5:25, no such example was discovered in
reviewing the cases in this study. Thus, this procedure yielded
substantially all of the subset of affirmed death sentences in
which the Virginia Supreme Court rejected merits review of an
issue on appeal as procedurally defaulted because of a contem-
poraneous-rule violation. The contemporaneous-objection rule
was found to be the largest and most important group of proce-
durally defaulted issues in the cases reviewed.
This analysis, therefore, omits a few procedurally defaulted
issues not involving the contemporaneous-objection rule, such as
the default in Coleman v. Thompson,3 which involved a de-
fault stemming from the failure to timely file a notice of appeal
from a denial of relief from an adverse state habeas decision.
This omission is not significant given that the direct compari-
son with Kentucky revolves around reversals (not affirmances)
where the salient issue has been defaulted. The attempt to find
find all of the relevant cases. The KENTUCKY DEATH PENALTY MANUAL (1990) was
also consulted.
302. See infra section V.C.5.a. Virginia did, however, reverse a capital conviction
resulting in a life sentence in Ball v. Commonwealth, 273 S.E.2d 790 (Va. 1981)
despite a procedural default of the only meritorious issue where the elements of the
capital crime were never proved.
303. VA. Sup. CT. R. 5:25 (1995).
304. 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
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cases affirming a death sentence where one or more issues were
defaulted was made to assess the kinds of issues being default-
ed to see if the comparison with Kentucky would be rendered
invalid because of differences in Virginia law. Locating the
largest and most important group of procedural-defaults in
these cases sufficed for this purpose. As will be seen, this data
tends to support the analysis herein advanced. °5
This study is limited to cases occurring under Kentucky and
Virginia's modern post-Furman death penalty statutes.3" Cas-
es arising under the older, unconstitutional legislation were not
considered regardless of when the decision was actually report-
ed. This study ends with Bussell v. Commonwealth,"°7 decided
by the Kentucky Supreme Court on April 21, 1994. This study
is limited to published opinions in death sentence cases; no
unpublished cases, other than summary denials on state habeas
308corpus, have been found either in Kentucky or Virginia.
305. The date for this comparison was derived from cases that were grouped into
specific categories. The lists for these cases, which are not reproduced here, are ap-
pendices to the original manuscript of this article, and now are on file with the Uni-
versity of Richmond Law Review. Although the appendices are not reproduced here, it
is helpful to understand how the cases were categorized into the individual appendi-
ces.
The Virginia death penalty cases affirming death sentences are found in Appen-
dix Va.1. Cases in which a single death row inmate had more than one reported case
from the Virginia Supreme Court, and a synopsis of the reasons therefore, are found
in Appendix Va.2. Virginia reversals of death sentences are found in Appendix. Va.3.,
and procedural defaults stemming from contemporaneous objection rule violations are
found in Appendix Va.4.
Kentucky Supreme Court affirmance of death sentences are found in Appendix
Ky.1, multiple cases attributable to a single inmate are found in appendix Ky.2, re-
versals are found in appendix Ky.3. Procedurally defaulted claims which nonetheless
resulted, in whole or in part, in a reversal of a death sentence are found in appendix
Ky.4.
306. For example, Hudson v. Commonwealth, 597 S.W.2d 610 (Ky. 1980) is omitted
from this study because the crime occurred before Kentucky's post-Furman death-
penalty statute had become applicable and the Kentucky Supreme Court held that
the revised death penalty statute could not under state law be retroactively applied.
307. 882 S.W.2d l1 (Ky. 1994).
308. There are no unpublished death penalty opinions from the Kentucky Supreme
Court. Letter from Jeffry C. Hoehler, attorney with the Kentucky Capital Litigation
Resource Center, to the author (Nov. 8, 1993) (on fie with the author). Likewise,
there are no unpublished death penalty cases from Virginia on direct appeal. The Vir-
ginia Supreme Court has routinely denied habeas appeal summarily in unpublished
one sentence orders. Without reviewing the briefs and motions filed in each such
case, it is impossible to determine whether or not, and if so, to what extent, proce-
durally defaulted issues have been raised in these unreported summary denials.
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3. Limitations of the Study and Indications for Future
Research
Kentucky, unlike Virginia, has had relatively few cases reach
federal habeas corpus.? Thus, it was not possible to compare
the incidence of procedural-defaults in federal habeas corpus.
This could potentially change the estimate somewhat of retrials
that would be required under a more relaxed procedural-default
rule. However, there is no reason to suspect that the Kentucky
federal district courts or the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
would be any more forgiving of procedurally defaulted claims
than the Kentucky Supreme Court is. 310 Thus, while this is an
unavoidable weakness in the data, the overall incidence of pro-
cedural-defaults that result in reversals is not likely to change
significantly from federal habeas corpus review. The data thus
obtained is suggestive rather than determinative.
The fact that the Virginia Supreme Court does not publish
opinions in most of its denials of habeas corpus appeals is an-
other unavoidable potential weakness in the data. However,
given the nature of claims that can be litigated at this level
(essentially they are limited to ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claims..) this is not likely to be a fertile source of new proce-
dural-defaults, although additional defaults made by original
trial counsel could be identified at this level.
Further research can mitigate these problems. Kentucky will
indubitably soon have many more federal habeas corpus death
penalty cases for comparison with Virginia. This would elimi-
nate the largest potential source of error in this study. Further-
more, there are other states with active death penalty statutes
309. See THE KENTUCKY DEATH PENALTY MANuAL (1990) (reporting only two death
row inmates with three published opinions in the federal courts).
310. The care with which Kentucky supervises its trial courts in death penalty
cases is shown by its high reversal rate. It is unlikely that the federal habeas courts
will reverse many cases that have survived the Kentucky Supreme Court's meticulous
review. And because the better issues will have been winnowed out by the Kentucky
Supreme Court, the federal habeas court will likely have an easier time with the
issues that it does review. This is an added efficiency that does not appear to have
been considered by the courts.
311. See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
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that have procedural-default rules that are more relaxed than
Virginia's. Louisiana, for example, has a large death row, and
its execution frequency is almost identical to that of Virgin-
ia.312 As in Kentucky, Louisiana's procedural-default rules are
somewhat relaxed in death penalty cases. 13 A summary re-
view of the federal habeas jurisprudence suggests that Louisi-
ana has had comparable numbers of death sentences that have
reached federal habeas review. Anecdotal evidence, including
discussions with attorneys that are familiar with Louisiana's
capital punishment jurisprudence, review of the execution rates,
and unsystematic review of Louisiana case law on the point,
suggests that Louisiana's experience with procedurally defaulted
issues in capital cases is similar to that of Kentucky--only a
few cases are reversed and remanded for retrial because of
meritorious claims that were defaulted. Thus, Louisiana would
be a prime candidate for a systematic comparative study. The
more comparisons that can be made, the greater the confidence
in the result.
There is a theoretical problem with the data as well. The
justice/efficiency tension arguably colors all appellate reviews in
capital cases, not only those including defaulted claims. One
could argue that Kentucky's higher reversal rate in capital
cases suggests that the Kentucky Supreme Court is more in-
312. Virginia and Louisiana are among the states that most often execute, as is
shown by the following table. The population statistics are from the 1992 population
estimates from the U.S. Bureau of Census as reported in the Statistical Abstract of
the United States 1993 by the U.S. Department of Commerce. The execution data is
from Death Row U.S.A., supra note 84.
State Population Number of Percentage Executions
Executions of Total per Million
Texas 17,656,000 74 31.90% 4.2
Florida 13,488,000 32 13.79% 2.4
Virginia 6,377,000 23 9.91% 3.6
Lousiana 4,287,000 21 9.05% 4.9
Kentucky 3,755,000 0 0 0
313. See, e.g., State v. Clark, 492 So. 2d 862 (La. 1986).
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clined to accept less efficiency in death penalty cases. If Ken-
tucky has a lower threshold for reversal in capital cases, it
would make it seemingly more difficult to single out the proce-
dural-default issue. However, the fact that so few of these cases
actually turned on issues that were procedurally defaulted sug-
gests that the procedural-default component of the jus-
tice/efficiency tension within the judicial process in Kentucky
remains quite low. It seems reasonable to assume that, even if
Kentucky were considered to be somewhat more tolerant of
judicial inefficiency, the cause is not its position on procedural-
default which has affected few death penalty cases.
4. A Short Summary of the Procedural-Default Regimes of
Virginia and Kentucky
a. Virginia
The Virginia Supreme Court refuses to notice alleged error
"unless objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the
time of the ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable
this Court to attain the ends of justice."14 This is Virginia's
formulation of the contemporaneous objection rule; it precludes
merits review of trial errors not contemporaneously objected to,
unless one of the exceptions, "good cause shown" or "ends of
justice" applies.
The "good cause shown" exception has not been found to
apply to any cases and was only once discussed, and that in
1927." It is thus of little utility to modern litigators. Despite
broad dicta emanating from an early case, 16 the "ends of jus-
tice" exception is narrowly limited. It has only been applied
where the evidence of the crime proved by the prosecution
(viewing the evidence most favorably to the prosecution) fails to
establish the statutory charge.
For example, although the Virginia Supreme Court has never
looked past a procedural-default to reverse a death sentence, it
314. VA. SUP. CT. R. 5:25 (formerly R. 5:21) (1995).
315. Owens v. Commonwealth, 136 S.E. 765, 768 (Va. 1927).
316. Shocket v. Silberman, 165 S.E.2d 414 (Va. 1969).
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did reverse a life sentence in a capital case despite a procedur-
al-default in Ball v. Commonwealth.317 There the prosecution's
evidence "construed in the light most favorable to the Common-
wealth showed that [the victim] was killed during an attempted
robbery, rather than the actual commission of robbery."318
Since capital murder required the commission of a robbery as a
necessary predicate, proof merely of an attempted robbery failed
to meet the statutory definition; hence, the Virginia Supreme
Court reversed despite counsel's failure to properly raise the
issue at trial. Similarly, in Jimenez v. Commonwealth,"' a
non-capital fraud case, it was clear from the face of the record
that an essential element of the crime was missing. Thus, while
the language "ends of justice" might be susceptible to a broad
construction, the Virginia Supreme Court has effectively limited
this exception to a narrow class of cases-only prosecutions that
fail on the face of the record to adduce any credible proof of a
statutory element of the crime have been reversed despite a
procedural-default. Virginia's procedural-default rules are strict-
ly applied in death penalty cases. 2 '
b. Kentucky
Kentucky rule RCr 9.22 requires a party to "make[] known to
the court the action which he desires the court to take or his
objection to the action of the court." 2' This is Kentucky's ver-
sion of the contemporaneous objection rule, and absent "mani-
fest injustice," which is rarely found, the rule is rigorously
enforced in non-capital cases, and even in capital convictions
where no death sentence was imposed.322 Failure to make
timely objection is generally fatal to an issue on appeal in cases
where a death sentence was not imposed. However, the rule is
different in death-penalty cases. There, "every prejudicial error
must be considered, whether or not an objection was made in
317. 273 S.E.2d 790 (Va. 1981).
318. Id. at 792.
319. 402 S.E.2d 678 (Va. 1991).
320. See supra note 298.
321. KY. R. CRIM. PROC. 9.22 (1994).
322. See, e.g., Harris v. Commonwealth, 793 S.W.2d 802 (Ky. 1990); West v. Com-
monwealth, 780 S.W.2d 600 (Ky. 1989); Davis v. Commonwealth, 795 S.W.2d 942 (Ky.
1990); Shannon v. Commonwealth, 767 S.W.2d 548 (Ky. 1988).
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the trial court."" Only an intentional failure to object "for
reasons of trial tactics" 31 will prevent consideration of preju-
dicial error. Thus, Kentucky continues to hew to a rule, at least
where death sentences are involved, similar to that of Fay v.
Noia, ' although the Kentucky rule predates Fay. =
In effect, Kentucky's rule, although not directly tied to the
federal rule in any way (the Kentucky cases rarely cite federal
precedent for this rule, and this is not surprising since the
Kentucky rule is older) dispenses with the "cause" prong of
Wainwright v. Sykes.3"7 And the cases studied do not appear
to employ an unduly restrictive notion of prejudice. This has al-
lowed the Kentucky Supreme Court to grant relief in death-
sentence cases despite procedural-defaults that would have
prevented the Virginia Supreme Court from entertaining the
same issue on appeal.
5. The Findings
a. Virginia
The Virginia Supreme Court has affirmed death sentences in
eighty-four cases since Smith v. Murray,3 = the first appeal
under the modern statute. It has reversed (usually with a re-
mand for resentencing) in six for an affirmance rate of more
than ninety-three percent. Virginia has never looked past a
procedural-default in a death-sentence case." It has affirmed
323. Ice v. Commonwealth, 667 S.W.2d 671, 674 (Ky. 1984).
324. Id.
325. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
326. See, e.g., Smith v. Commonwealth, 366 S.W.2d 902 (Ky. 1963); Bowman v.
Commonwealth, 290 S.W.2d 814 (Ky. 1956); Edwards v. Commonwealth, 182 S.W.2d
948 (Ky. 1944).
327. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
328. 248 S.E.2d 135 (Va. 1978).
329. See Ira P. Robbins, Toward A More Just And Effective System Of Review In
State Death Penalty Cases, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 31 n.54 (1990) (statement of Richard
Bonnie and others). The Robbins article indicates that Virginia had never looked past
a procedural default to reverse a death sentence. This statement was corroborated in
three different ways. First, all Virginia Supreme Court death penalty cases reported
were read. Second, the subset of procedural defaults in death penalty cases was iden-
tified and reviewed independently, and all reversals of death sentences were reviewed.
Finally, all cases annotated under the "ends of Justice" or "good cause shown" excep-
tions to Rule 5:25 and its predecessor Rule 5:21 were reviewed. Thus, the fact that
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death sentences in fifty-one cases where the reported decision
notes that one or more issues were defaulted as a result of a
violation of the contemporaneous-objection rule of Rule 5:25 or
its predecessor Rule 5:21. Thus, in ninety-one reported death-
sentence cases, the Virginia Supreme Court has never forgiven
a procedurally defaulted claim, regardless of how egregious the
error or how great the injustice done.330
b. Kentucky
The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed twenty-seven of fifty-
two death-sentence cases and reversed twenty-five under the
1976 legislation reinstituting the death penalty.33' This yields
an affirmance rate of 51.9%21 for the period under study. The
Kentucky Supreme Court reversed four death penalties in
whole or in part upon issues that had been procedurally de-
faulted.3 33 Thus, only four of fifty-two cases (or 7.7%) of the
reversals in Kentucky came in cases where a procedural-default
Virginia had never looked past a procedural default to reverse a death penalty was
confirmed. It did reverse a capital conviction resulting in life imprisonment in Ball v.
Commonwealth, 273 S.E.2d 790 (1981).
330. See supra section V.B. (for discussion and examples of unjust results
stemming from procedurally defaulted issues).
331. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025-.140 (Baldwin 1990 & Cure. Supp. 1994). The
first death sentence to reach the Kentucky Supreme Court under this statute was
reversed because of trial error. Smith v. Commonwealth, 599 S.W.2d 900 (Ky. 1980).
The first affirmed death sentence occurred in Gall v. Commonwealth, 607 S.W.2d 97
(Ky. 1980).
332. If only direct appeals are considered, then, in Kentucky, there were for the
study period 23 affirmed death sentences out of 49 direct appeal cases involving a
death sentence for an affirmance rate of 46.9%.
333. See Appendix Ky.4, supra note 305. The case Cosby v. Commonwealth, 776
S.W.2d 367 (Ky. 1989) involved two defendants (Teddy Cosby and Christopher Walls)
who were tried together and who both received death sentences. Both had a number
of procedurally defaulted issues on appeal. Cosby's case was reversed because of error
that was defaulted, but Wall's case was reversed as a result of error that was not
defaulted. Both cases also involved a defaulted double jeopardy issue that the court
reached because the cases were remanded for trial. However, it is not clear that this
error was prejudicial. Both defendants had received double death sentences (one for
kidnapping and one for the murder). Thus, reversing the kidnapping death sentence
would have left the death sentence for murder intact. For this reason this issue is
not included in the Kentucky analysis. If included it would bring to five the number
of meritorious procedurally defaulted cases that were reversed in part because of the
defaulted issue. The number of cases where the sole meritorious issue was defaulted
would remain at two.
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would have precluded review in Virginia. Procedurally defaulted
issues were unsuccessfully asserted in three other cases in
which death sentences were affirmed.3" Since at least two of
the cases involving procedurally defaulted issues also contained
meritorious claims that were not defaulted,335 it can be con-
tended that Kentucky reversed only two death sentences solely
as a result of error that had not been objected to and preserved
at trial. This yields a 3.8% reversal rate (one case in 26.5) of
death sentences where the only meritorious error was defaulted.
The first post-Furman death penalty cases reached the Ken-
tucky Supreme Court in 1980. Thus, Kentucky reversed only
two cases in nearly fourteen years where the sole meritorious
error was procedurally defaulted. Where the Kentucky Supreme
Court addressed and disposed of alleged error that was proce-
durally defaulted, it often did so cursorily in a short paragraph
stating that the error was not prejudicial."3 6
6. Analysis and Conclusion
Procedures governing the orderly presentation of cases and
appeals are necessary-no system of justice could long operate
without such procedures. However, any efficiency enhancing
procedural device within a legal system must be balanced
against its effect on justice. Procedures designed to promote
efficiency have a cost; to the extent that they deprive a litigant
334. Because the Kentucky Supreme Court does not identify or discuss issues on
appeal that it finds to be frivolous or completely without merit, it is impossible to de-
termine the number of times that procedurally defaulted issues were found to be
without merit, by the Kentucky Supreme Court. The Virginia Supreme Court has
strictly enforced procedural default at least 51 times. The three cases found in which
the Kentucky Supreme Court overlooked the procedural default only to determine the
issue adversely to petitioner were Simmons v. Commonwealth, 746 S.W.2d 393 (Ky.
1988); Stanford v. Commonwealth, 734 S.W.2d 781 (Ky. 1987); Gall v. Commonwealth,
607 S.W. 2d 97 (Ky. 1980).
335. Sanborn v. Commonwealth, 754 S.W.2d 534, 542 (Ky. 1988) ("Here, the errors
taken collectively mandate reversal, eliminating the need to quibble over individual
questions of preservation."); Moore v. Commonwealth, 634 S.W.2d 426 (Ky. 1982).
336. See, e.g., Sanders v. Commonwealth, 801 S.W.2d 665, 675 (Ky. 1990), cert.
denied, 502 U.S. 831 (1991) (complaint that a victim of a prior shooting sat in court-
room in a wheelchair disposed of in one paragraph that concluded: "We therefore see
no appreciable possibility that the jury was affected by her presence, or that the
defendant suffered prejudice to his substantial rights.").
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of a hearing on the merits they erode public and private per-
ceptions of fairness. Indeed, they undercut fairness itself.
While balancing justice against efficiency may appear to
compare incomparables, it is possible, nevertheless, to assess a
particular rule's efficiency-its relative contribution to the over-
all efficiency of the system of justice. One can determine how
change providing more merits resolutions of claims would likely
affect a system of justice by (1) evaluating a rule's performance
in actual cases over time, and (2) comparing it with the work-
ings of variant rules from another similar jurisdiction with
otherwise comparable cases.
Few could argue with the proposition that death-sentenced
prisoners provide the most compelling case for merits resolution
of claims. However one strikes the balance between efficiency
and justice, death row cases surely remain the one area of law
where efficiency arguments carry the least weight. They are the
one area where society most demands accurate determinations
of fact and law. They are, therefore, the types of cases where it
is most important to determine the relative efficiency or ineffi-
ciency of procedural rules intended to enhance efficiency.
Procedural-default rules act as a gatekeeper, cutting off
claims without resolution of the merits. This arguably promotes
finality; claims thus procedurally extinguished cannot be re-
manded for redetermination. Thus, finality is seen to promote
efficiency-one case is disposed of, and others can take its
place. The cost to justice of refusing to decide potentially meri-
torious claims in death-penalty cases is in the execution of
persons whose cases might have been decided otherwise but for
the ignorance or negligence of their lawyers in failing to proper-
ly raise and preserve the appropriate claims. This is indeed a
high cost and makes it particularly appropriate to evaluate the
actual efficiency of these rules as balanced against the cost to
justice. The data suggests that Virginia's rigid procedural-de-
fault rules fail to measurably increase the efficiency of the
system of justice in death penalty cases. Indeed these rules
spawn countervailing inefficiencies in the litigation over wheth-
er or not an issue has been defaulted, and if defaulted, whether
excuse for the default exists.
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Although Virginia reports fifty-one cases in which issues were
procedurally defaulted, analysis of those cases reveals many in
which the issues were clearly without merit. For example,
Mueller v. Commonwealth131 offered up a potpourri of motions
to set aside the verdict and objections to trial evidence that
would have been clearly within the discretion of the trial judge.
It would have been just as easy for the Virginia Supreme Court
to have rejected these claims on the merits as it was to list
them and to note that they had been procedurally defaulted.
Virginia could have written one short paragraph on these
claims on the merits the same way that Kentucky does when
confronted by meritless issues. It would serve no purpose to go
laboriously through all of the issues that were procedurally
defaulted, but yet could have been easily decided as contrary to
existing precedent or otherwise without merit within the group
of fifty-one cases studied. Suffice it to say that the vast majori-
ty of claims would have fit that description. If Virginia were to
adopt the Kentucky policy of not even discussing most meritless
issues, the job would be even simpler. Indeed, it appears that
the only reason for the Virginia Supreme Court's fastidiousness
in listing and discussing every issue raised by a death-sen-
tenced appellant is to note all those that have been defaulted.
It is likely that far from seeking to do justice, the Virginia
Supreme Court seeks to list all possible procedural-defaults in
order to foreclose federal habeas review.38
The most compelling reason to think that relaxation of proce-
dural-default would be unlikely to open the floodgates is the
experience that Kentucky has had with a far more lenient poli-
cy. Only two of twenty-five reversals were solely attributable to
337. 422 S.E.2d 380 (Va. 1992).
338. The plain statement rule of Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255 (1989), forecloses
federal habeas review of procedurally defaulted claims if, and only if, the state's last
appellate court clearly and expressly states that its judgment rests on a state proce-
dural bar. Thus, the Virginia Supreme Court's listing seriatim of all procedurally de-
faulted issues in all death penalty cases is designed to foreclose federal review of all
such issues. Because Kentucky's procedural-default rules are more relaxed, it can
afford to simply ignore any issues that it deems meritless, thus conserving appellate
time and resources. And because Kentucky carefully scrutinizes death penalty appeals,
reversing more often than Virginia, it appears unlikely that the federal habeas courts
will often reverse Kentucky death sentences. Thus, it is arguable that, in the long
run, the Kentucky judicial system is more efficient than is Virginia's in handling
death-sentence appeals.
1996] 373
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
issues that were procedurally defaulted. This affected two out of
fifty-two death sentences. Kentucky jurisprudence is hardly less
efficient than Virginia's as a result of it attempting to do jus-
tice in death penalty cases. If Kentucky, with its much higher
reversal rate in death penalty cases than Virginia, found only
two of fifty-two (or four of fifty-two if one includes all meritori-
ous defaulted claims) to be the reason for reversing death sen-
tences, then Virginia with its lower reversal rate is likely to
find that it would only need to reverse very few cases where
the meritorious issue was procedurally defaulted.
Because issues that have been procedurally defaulted are not
noticed by Virginia, and are therefore not discussed, it is impos-
sible to be certain of the exact number of meritorious cases that
would have warranted reversal but for a procedural-default.
What is certain is that the number would indubitably be small.
Only one case thus far seems certain to meet this criteri-
on--Smith v. Murray."9  Coppola v Commonwealth' and
Beavers v. Commonwealth34' both involved the kinds of error
that could potentially affect the accuracy of the proceedings, but
the facts are not sufficiently developed to know whether the
error was prejudicial. Perhaps that is as far as the analysis
need go. If only a very few cases would be affected by a relax-
ation of Virginia's procedural-default rules then efficiency can-
not be much diminished by the change. Indeed, the sheer
amount of litigation over the issue of procedural-default indi-
cates that efficiency would be enhanced by rules, like
Kentucky's, that relax procedural-default in death-penalty cases.
The fact that efficiency cannot be the sole basis for Virginia's
strict procedural-default rule leads one to look elsewhere. Once
we eliminate the stated purposes the real purpose must lie
elsewhere.
339. 447 U.S. 527 (1986). For a detailed discussion of this case, see supra section
V.B.1.
340. 257 S.E.2d 797 (Va. 1979).
341. 427 S.E.2d 411 (Va. 1993).
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VI. THE DEREGULATION OF DEATH
Few contemporary issues are more divisive or hotly debated
than the death penalty. Habeas corpus reform has been central
to that debate. Those who criticize federal habeas corpus as
obstructing lawful, democratically endorsed state penal policies
typically emphasize the inefficiency and antidemocratic tenden-
cies of overlaying a removed federal judiciary upon the state
criminal justice system. These critics represent the political
forces that would greatly constrain or end federal habeas juris-
diction over the state criminal justice system. They have, for
the time being, won. Those who remain wary of state enforce-
ment of constitutional values, and who lean toward abolition of
capital punishment, protest the loss of the procedural remedy
formerly provided by habeas corpus. My predilections are with
the latter group. I recognize, however, that complete return to
the habeas corpus of the Warren Court is, for the moment,
politically naive. However, there are compromise positions wor-
thy of consideration as an interim step in route to a fairer
system.
In 1988 the American Bar Association convened a politically
diverse group of Judges, scholars, a court administrator, prose-
cutors, and defense lawyers in the American Bar Association
Task Force on Death Penalty Habeas Corpus. This group held
public hearings in Atlanta, Dallas, and San Francisco, and
heard from knowledgeable witnesses from all over the country.
The resulting report was adopted by the American Bar Associa-
tion House of Delegates as Association policy on February 13,
1990. 2 As with any compromise proposal on a politically sen-
sitive topic developed by a committee, these ABA policy recom-
mendations, by attempting to have something for everyone,
succeeded in satisfying no one. Task force members from both
sides of the debate dissented, and their dissents are included in
the report.3" The principal advantage of the ABA recommen-
dations is that they, or something like them, may be politically
feasible. While these proposals are flawed, they would be a step
342. The report is found in Robbins, supra note 329, at 9.
343. Id. at 195 (Appendix A to the ABA Report, containing separate statements of
members of the task force).
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toward a fairer system of capital punishment. As such, they
deserve support.
On the positive side, the ABA recommendations relax proce-
dural-default rules, rationalize the stay of execution procedures
in capital cases, and loosen slightly some of the other demand-
ing procedural barriers erected by the Rehnquist Court. The
problem is that the proposals fail to do enough.
For example, the recommendations concerning the competen-
cy of counsel focus on criteria for determining qualifications of
counsel, and with the training and recruitment of competent
counsel.' While this may help, unless the performance stan-
dards of Strickland are modified, all too many cases of shoddy
performance will continue to occur. There are several reasons
for this.
For one, many of the criteria are based on experience. Thus,
inept lawyers who have tried capital cases poorly will continue
to qualify. The increase in attorney's fees in capital cases in
some areas has already attracted less able lawyers who are
interested in the higher fees without regard to their own lack
of professional qualifications. Moreover, many rural areas lack
public defender systems. In those areas trial judges routinely
appoint defense lawyers for indigent defendants. Judges who
select defense counsel will more likely appoint the most compe-
tent available lawyers if it is in their interest to so do. The
realistic threat of reversal, where the conviction and death
sentence is the product of incompetency of counsel, is the most
effective incentive to induce the appointment of truly qualified
counsel in these cases.
Thus, where money is lacking, competency standards applied
post-conviction will induce reform; where money has become
available to pay competent counsel, adequate post-conviction
standards for evaluating counsel's performance post-trial induce
trial judges to appoint the best people pre-trial. As a result, the
performance standards that are applied in the post-conviction
process are critical; without realistic federal oversight of
counsel's performance, shoddy legal work in capital cases will
344. Id. at 9 (recommendations one, two, and three).
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continue. Thus, the failure to address Strickland is a serious
flaw in the ABA recommendations.
Furthermore, the relaxation of procedural-default rules in the
ABA proposal fails to go far enough. In order to surmount the
bar of a procedural default, the proposal requires the habeas
petitioner to show that it was the result of counsel's ignorance
or neglect, or that the imposition of the bar would result in a
miscarriage of justice." Putting the burden of proof on peti-
tioner is unfair in this circumstance. The former trial counsel,
whose judgment is being questioned, will have a strong incen-
tive to try to cast her actions as strategic and not neglectful.
This variant of the procedural-default rule would not reach the
injustice of Michael Marnell Smith's case. There trial counsel
raised at trial but foolishly failed to preserve on appeal merito-
rious Estelle error despite the issues having been raised by an
appellate amicus brief. The ABA proposal, while a step in the
right direction, fails to eradicate the injustice of the present
system.
The ABA recommendations were made and adopted shortly
after the Teague decision (1989) and before the full ramifica-
tions of that decision became apparent. It is, therefore, not sur-
prising that the ABA dealt with the issue cursorily and, from
the perspective of today, inadequately. The proposal is that
"[t]he standard for determining whether changes in federal
constitutional law should apply retroactively should be whether
failure to apply the new law would undermine the accuracy of
either the guilt or the sentencing determination."3" As was
previously argued, innocence is not the only value worth protec-
tion. The timing of a claim should not determine whether some-
one lives or dies. The ABA proposal goes far beyond what is
necessary to protect the reliance interests of states in existing
constitutional law. If Teague is not reversed, then it should at
least be far more narrowly constrained than would be the case
upon adoption of the ABA recommendations.
The failure to adequately address three of the most impor-
tant issues facing federal death penalty habeas corpus-the
effective assistance of counsel, procedural-default, and retroac-
345. Id. at 10 (recommendation seven).
346. Id. at 11 (recommendation fifteen).
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tivity-render the ABA recommendations flawed. These recom-
mendations are voluminous (the entire report including dissents
and appendices is 296 pages). Many of the reforms address less
important concerns. It would serve little purpose to outline here
all of the proposals, or to attempt to criticize all the flaws. The
report moves in the right direction and should thus become a
part of the debate. The report is, however, only a practical step
toward a more rational system of capital punishment; it should
not be viewed as the end of the process.
The task of reforming the Rehnquist Court's reforms is long
overdue. How might this best be accomplished? How can death
be reregulated? First and perhaps foremost, if competent coun-
sel with adequate resources were provided to indigent capital
defendants, many of the injustices of the present capital pun-
ishment system would be significantly moderated. However,
even competent counsel will find only the semblance and not
the substance of justice if onerous procedural-default rules and
overly rigid nonretroactivity rules continue to permit state
courts to ignore, or unfaithfully apply, federal constitutional
law. Thus, as was contended in the discussions of retroactivity
and procedural-default, provisions for competent counsel must
be supplemented by realistic incentives so that state courts
faithfully follow federal constitutional commands. The rules
governing retroactivity and procedural-default should be signifi-
cantly relaxed, particularly in capital cases.
Finally, there is a pressing need to reduce the befuddling
complexity of the present system. As we have seen in section
III,"' the rules concerning the exhaustion of remedies con-
tinually bounce prisoners back and forth between the state and
federal court systems. Simplifying these rules will allow the
courts to more easily and rapidly address the merits and will
reduce the procedural wrangling inherent in the current sys-
tem. In particular, the strict rules governing mixed petitions
should be relaxed in death-penalty habeas corpus cases.
There have been proposals designed to tinker with the state
criminal justice systems without addressing federal habeas
corpus reform. More resources for capital cases, certification of
347. Clarke (pt. 1), supra note 129, at 1356.
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counsel in capital cases, and pleas for a higher degree of profes-
sionalism, have all been proposed.' As desirable as each of
these are, none, individually or collectively, will cure the pres-
ent system without reform of habeas corpus.
Exhortations to the bar for better self-regulation always have
limited impact, and in this situation have utterly failed. Fur-
ther, no amount of pleas to state legislatures for money with
which to pay for capital defense is likely to accomplish the
needed change. The political climate for providing money for
the defense of heinous criminals has never been favorable.
State legislatures are only likely to seriously address these
issues when they find that they must do so in order for the
system to function; as long as they can scrape along stingily,
they will.
Additionally, without resources, certification of capital defense
specialists is doomed. Lack of resources, haphazard training
and a failure to monitor the actual performance of counsel post-
conviction are only compounded by the existence of weak crite-
ria for the selection of counsel in capital cases. However, stron-
ger criteria governing the selection of counsel in capital cases
will not emanate from any legislature because it means that
few willing lawyers will qualify. Here is the catch-22 of capital
defense litigation. Without money the criteria will be weak.
Without the threat of reversal when counsel is inept, the money
will rarely flow. Even when states adequately compensate coun-
sel, incentives are needed to insure that only competent lawyers
are appointed to these cases. Trial judges often control the
process of who is appointed to capital defense work and how
much they are paid. The threat of a habeas reversal acts as a
powerful incentive for the appointment of competent and ade-
quately compensated counsel.
Federal habeas corpus, I contend, is uniquely positioned to
accomplish all the needed reforms for several reasons: (1) The
states would provide competent counsel and adequate resources
if such were necessary for them to carry out executions. Federal
348. See, e.g., Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty
Promise of the Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 625 (1986). The author has worked on proposals for the certification of
counsel in capital cases which were proposed to the Virginia legislature.
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habeas corpus could provide the incentive if state decisions
were realistically subject to reversal where competent counsel
was not provided; (2) State courts would be more consistent in
applying Supreme Court precedent on constitutional issues were
there closer oversight of their decision-making than is possible
solely with certiorari review at the Supreme Court level. Relax-
ation of retroactivity and procedural-default rules in capital
punishment habeas cases could accomplish this by reinstituting
federal habeas court oversight for this narrow class of cases;
and (3) Only minor changes in the doctrine of exhaustion would
be necessary in order to make the system more rational. Let us
consider these and other reasons for returning federal habeas
oversight of death penalty litigation in turn.
Strickland v. Washington's349 flawed standard for evaluating
the effective assistance of counsel ought to be scrapped. The
standard for measuring counsel's competence in capital cases
should be that of what is reasonable among capital defense
lawyers in the nation as a whole.35°
Senior Circuit Judge Elbert Tuttle of the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Eleventh Circuit has said that "placing the respon-
sibility for knowing the complex body of constitutional law that
governs capital trials upon lawyers in the rural South is 'ex-
pecting entirely too much.' 35' While this may be true at pres-
ent, it need not remain so. Were lawyers in the rural South
adequately paid, provided with sufficient resources and reason-
able training opportunities, then competent lawyers would no
longer avoid these cases. It is unjust to continue to execute
people while refusing to provide counsel reasonably conversant
with the governing law.
The prejudice requirement in ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
cases must also be relaxed. Once a defendant has made a pri-
ma facie showing of prejudice the burden should shift to the
349. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
350. See, e.g. Clarke (pt. 1), supra note 129, at 1356 (proposals for changing inef-
fective assistance of counsel doctrine).
351. Robbins, supra note 329, at 28 (quoting Judge Tuttle). Speaking as a rural
Southern lawyer, I entirely agree with Judge Tuttle. The reasons for the complexity
of death penalty litigation, and the problems that rural generalists have with capital
punishment litigation are detailed in Clarke (pt. 1), supra note 129, at 1356.
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state to demonstrate that the defendant was not prejudiced by
counsel's incompetence. It is too easy for a court, confronted by
evidence that trial counsel was incompetent, to engage in a
priori justifications of the result. The workings of juries remain
a mystery. The fact that a jury convicted and sentenced a per-
son to death upon one presentation of the facts does not dictate
what might have happened upon a markedly better presenta-
tion. This is true regardless of the atrocity of the murder. The
Strickland prejudice requirement permits a court to pretend
that no matter how egregious counsel's errors the result would
have been the same. Not only is this a leap of logic, this result
is unjust. Juries are affected by how a case is presented, the
evidence, and the arguments made in support thereof. Alloca-
tion of the burden of proof ought not provide the pretext to
pretend otherwise.
The discussion of procedural-default in section IV supra, held
that Wainwright v. Syke's" "cause and prejudice" standard
for determining whether to enforce a state procedural bar
should be replaced with the "deliberate by-pass" rule of Fay v.
Noia.3" This would have three beneficial effects.
First, as we have seen, the doctrine of procedural-default is
inextricably linked to the competency of counsel issue."s Thus,
relaxation of procedural-default rules would have the effect of
encouraging the states to assure that competent counsel was
available in all capital cases. Competent counsel, familiar with
death penalty jurisprudence, will commit fewer defaults; hence
the problem of dealing with defaulted issues on appeal will, on
this proposal, become less significant.
Second, the relaxation of procedural-default rules in federal
habeas corpus will inspire the state supreme courts to address
the merits of constitutional issues rather than to simply cede
the field to the federal habeas courts. It thereby invites a seri-
ous and searching review of those issues. The encouragement of
state court sensitivity to federal constitutional issues is a
worthwhile goal that has profound potential consequences for
death-penalty jurisprudence.
352. 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
353. 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
354. See supra section IV; Clarke (pt. 1), supra note 129, at 1356.
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Thirdly, and most tellingly, the relaxation of procedural-de-
fault rules will allow important constitutional issues to be re-
viewed on the merits in death penalty cases, thus reducing the
arbitrariness and capriciousness of the present system. Merits
review of fundamental constitutional issues ought not to hinge
on the quality of the lawyer appointed in a capital case. Who
lives and who dies should relate directly to moral culpability,
and not the happenstance of who got whom as a lawyer.
The rigid retroactivity rule of Teague v. Lane,55 and proge-
ny must be reversed or dramatically loosened. As our discussion
of retroactivity revealed, simple reversal of this onerous concept
would be the fairest proposal, at least as applied to death-
sentenced prisoners. It is unduly harsh to execute someone
whose trial was constitutionally and prejudicially flawed simply
because of the timing of the claim. That the rule applies only
one way-against criminal defendants, but in favor of the
states--condemns it as uneven and discriminatory justice.
Short of outright reversal, the next best approach would be to
narrow the scope of the definition of a "new rule" while, at the
same time, making the exceptions more flexible. Even if one
concedes the force of the argument that states should not be
reversed by a federal habeas court where the reason for the re-
versal is a completely new and unanticipated rule of law, it
does not follow that Teague constitutes the best remedy. State
courts do have some reliance interest in the rules of constitu-
tional law as enunciated by the Supreme Court at the time of a
given trial. Steadfast adherence to constitutional norms should
be rewarded. But, as we have seen, the state courts should not
be invited to adopt unfaithful and unduly cramped interpreta-
tions of that law. A "new rule" adequately protects a state's
reliance interest in current law when it is limited to direct
reversals of existing precedent or complete breaks with prior
law such that prediction of the new course would have been
difficult or impossible. A "new rule" should be limited to deci-
sions of the Supreme Court that create a rule that state jurists
could not reasonably have been expected to have foreseen.
Then, and only then, is the state's reliance interest such that
retroactive application should be precluded.
355. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
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Further, Teague's second exception356 should be cast in the
disjunctive, not the conjunctive. Either "watershed rules of
criminal procedure" or procedures affecting the accuracy of the
proceedings should suffice independently to allow even a new
rule to be applied in a capital habeas proceeding. Where a
procedural rule is truly watershed-that is, when it is found to
be "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty 357-- then it is im-
portant enough, without more, to apply to all death-sentenced
prisoners. It does not need the addition of being an accuracy
enhancing procedure if it is truly fundamental to ordered liber-
ty. Conversely, accuracy is vitally important to capital sentenc-
ing procedures. A new procedure that enhances the accuracy of
that process ought to apply to all under the threat or penalty of
death. Were the concept of a "new rule" suitably narrow, and if
Teague's second exception were more flexible, then the onerous
nature of the rule of nonretroactivity would be greatly palliated.
This would sufficiently recognize and protect the state criminal
justice system's reasonable reliance on the continued existence
and application of Supreme Court precedent.
The final proposal-resolution of the death row dilemma of
the exhaustion of remedies doctrine-could be the easiest of all
to solve. The exhaustion of remedies would not be such a prob-
lem if the federal habeas court could, and in the ordinary
course did, order a stay of proceedings covering the state court
post-conviction proceedings where state courts refused to issue
an appropriate stay. The relaxation of procedural-default rules
would solve the other exhaustion of remedies problem identified
in section III."' Sending a case back to state court only to
have that court invent, find, or otherwise enforce a new proce-
356. Teague's two exceptions allow new rules to be retroactively applied where: (1)
it places certain kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of the
criminal law-making authority to proscribe, and (2) it also permits retroactive applica-
tion for watershed rules of criminal procedure that are central to an accurate deter-
mination of guilt or innocence. See supra section IV.B. It is this conjunction of "wa-
tershed rules of criminal procedure" with the notion of accuracy that, as we saw in
section IV, makes the Teague exceptions so narrow as to be unavailable in most
cases.
357. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311.
358. Clarke (pt. 1), supra note 129, at 1356.
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dural bar makes no sense. But if procedural default were re-
formed then that problem would no longer be a part of the
exhaustion-of-remedies doctrine.
Of course, the bouncing of cases back and forth between the
state and federal courts remains inefficient. However, Professor
Bonnie has suggested a salutary reform. Exhaustion of reme-
dies would not be required in death penalty cases. Indeed, a
death-sentenced prisoner could forego state proceedings entirely,
and a state could (as did Arkansas) abolish post-conviction
review entirely. If a death-sentenced prisoner were to utilize an
available state post-conviction remedy, she would have to accept
the adverse impact that decision might have on future federal
proceedings. This would, if adopted, truncate proceedings with-
out denying the prisoner a federal habeas forum.'59 This
should satisfy those who are genuinely interested in efficiency.
Those who hide a political agenda behind efficiency arguments
will, of course, not be satisfied.
The story of the demise of habeas corpus is also the story of
the deregulation of death. Like trucking, airlines, and banking,
it seems, death is no different. Civil bureaucracies impede
industry, and habeas corpus impedes executions. Both are
swept away in the cause of greater efficiency. Execution may be
"the most irremediable and unfathomable of penalties,""6 but
when treated as a matter of efficiency, death is reduced to the
status of any other commodity. While federal habeas corpus
remains in the U.S. Code,36' it survives as an empty shell,
stripped of substance and devoid of meaning. It has become a
paper shuffling routine; no longer do archaic concepts like
justice or fairness impede the greased rails to the death house.
This legislative and political change was wrought, not by
Congress, but by the Supreme Court. The erection of a succes-
sion of procedural barriers, procedural-default, nonretroactivity,
the rule of complete exhaustion, and low standards for evalu-
ating the effective assistance of counsel, combine to create an
impenetrable and disingenuous morass, designed to give the ap-
pearance of justice without often, if ever, supplying a remedy.
359. Bonnie, supra note 253, at 113-14.
360. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986).
361. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1988).
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Cover and Alienikoff, writing in 1977, were prescient:
"[e]ventually [the Court] may achieve the quintessentially linear
criminal process, devoid of all redundancy, virtually costless,
and without meaning."3 2 The Justices have succeeded. Death
is now deregulated.
The hallmark of the Rehnquist Court jurisprudence has been
an extremely conservative, result oriented ideology that is
marked by a willingness to distort history and logic 6' in order
to speed the pace of executions. Injustice is the result. As we
have seen, Michael Marnell Smith and Aubrey Dennis Adams,
Jr.'s cases were unjust. They were executed because their law-
yers were not astute enough to raise the right issues at the
appropriate times. Meritorious issues overlooked solely because
of overly stringent retroactivity analysis is also unjust. Life and
death should not hinge on mere matters of timing. Capital
defendants represented by drug abusing, neglectful lawyers,
suffer a shameful injustice-witness the cases of John Young,
and John Sterling Gardner." Most tellingly, any system that
tolerates the execution of innocent persons and those that lack
the requisite moral culpability is inequitable.
Capital punishment will always remain arbitrary and capri-
cious. Unjust executions will continue. Human error being what
it is, the system can never be made wholly fair. That is a good
argument for the abolition of the death penalty. Until that time
comes one can only attempt to work for a fairer and more ratio-
nal system of capital punishment. Death must be reregulated.
Federal habeas corpus remains the best vehicle for accomplish-
ing that goal.
362. Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas
Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1100 (1977).
363. While this thesis has attempted to demonstrate the inconsistency and incoher-
ence of much of the Rehnquist Court's rulings, it has not attempted a systematic
review of the logical fallacies of that Court. For a critique of Justice Relmquist's
illogic see Andrew Jaw McClurg, Logical Fallacies and the Supreme Court: A Critical
Examination of Justice Rehnquist's Decisions in Criminal Procedure Cases 59 U.
CoLO. L. REv. 741 (1988). More impressionistic critiques abound. See, e.g., Dugger v.
Adams, 489 U.S. 401, 424-25 n.15. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("This incoherence in
the Court's decisionmaking would be disturbing in any case, but is especially shocking
in a capital case.... The Court both leaves the law in shambles and reinstates
respondent's death sentence without ever bothering to determine what legal principle
actually governs his case.").
364. See Clarke (pt. 1), supra note 129, at 1356.
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